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Measuring Constitutional Islamization:
The Islamic Constitutions Index
BY DAWOOD I. AHMED & MOAMEN GOUDA*
Abstract
The military coup in Egypt and the Taliban insurgency in Pakistan
and Afghanistan have once again highlighted the political stakes of
incorporating Islam within a constitution. Many constitutions in the
Muslim world contain clauses that recognize the Islamic character of
the state; yet, there is little scholarship empirically analyzing these
clauses; indeed, while much has been written about the effects of
incorporating a particular type of clause-the Islamic supremacy
clause, to date, we know very little about the comparative
constitutional universe of Islamic clauses: How prevalent is
Constitutional Islamization? Which countries have the most or least
Islamized constitutions? Do secular countries in the Muslim world
promise more human rights than Islamic countries? Does having
more Islam in the constitution correlate with weaker political
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participation and gender equality?
This Article tries to fills this gap. Relying on an original dataset
based on the coding of the constitutions of all Muslim majority
countries globally, it introduces the Islamic Constitutions Index
(ICI) -the first index to measure and rank constitutions according to
their Islamicity. Using this index as a proxy for Constitutional
Islamization, we investigate the universe of Islamic constitutions. Our
analysis shows that roughly half of all Muslim majority countries
have Islamic features in their constitutions and geography and
colonialism seem to have some influence on Islamicity. Further, Saudi
Arabia, Iran and Pakistan lead the rankings of Constitutional
Islamization while the Central Asian countries all have secular
constitutions. We also show that while Muslim countries'
constitutions generally promise a number of important human rights
and none explicitly incorporate corporal punishments, constitutions
that privilege secularism tend to, on average, promise more rights
than constitutions that privilege Islam. Indeed, of the top 10 countries
in the Muslim world measured in terms of de jure constitutional
promise of rights, all but one-Maldives, are secular. We also find
that Islamicity of the constitution seems to correlate negatively with
democracy, gender equality and political stability. Although
preliminary and not implying causation, our correlation analysis has
considerable implications: not only can it provide some support to
peace-making efforts with Islamic militant groups doubting the
Islamic character of the states they are fighting, it implies that the
Muslim world may in fact chart its own version of "Islamic
constitutional democracy" that may be different from the Western
paradigm of democracy. Further, our work lays the foundation for a
research agenda that investigates the relationship between political
Islam and constitutional democracy.
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Introduction
On July 3rd, 2013, General Abdul Fatah al-Sisi, the chief of the
Egyptian army, removed President Mohammed Morsi from power in
a coup d'6tat. Morsi, elected in 2013, had been Egypt's first ever
democratically elected president. The Chief Justice of the Supreme
Constitutional Court of Egypt was subsequently installed as the
interim president and Morsi was put under house arrest. Several
members of the Muslim Brotherhood -the political party to which
Morsi belonged -were arrested and killed.
General al-Sisi also suspended the Egyptian Constitution, which
was promulgated only a few months earlier and the acting president
issued a constitutional decree to make amendments to the 2012
constitution.1 A constitutional committee, composed of 50 members,
would propose the amendments.2 The Committee had hardly begun
its work when foreign observers began to refocus most of their
attention on speculating just how "Islamic" the amended constitution
might be.3 And indeed, the Committee was soon gridlocked over the
issue of Islam in the new constitution.4
Egypt's 1971 and 2012 Constitutions had contained clauses
entrenching the principles of Islamic law as the primary source of
legislation; and while some called the 2012 constitution, an "Islamic"
constitution, others alleged that it leaned towards "conservative"
Islam. Would the amended constitution be more or less "Islamic"
than its predecessor? One commentator argued that "Egypt's
constitutional declaration issued late on July 8 contains more
concessions to radical Islam than the constitution drawn up by
deposed President Hosni Mubarak."5 As speculation intensified over
1. Shadia Nasralla, Rows Over Egypt's Constitutional Decree Signal Hurdles
Ahead, REUTERS (July 9, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/O7/09/us-
egypt-protests-constitution-idUSBRE96815 R20130709.
2. Nathan J. Brown, Egypt's Daring Constitutional Gang of 50, FOREIGN POLICY
(Sept. 20, 2013), available at http://mideastafrica.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/09/
20/egypts-daring-constitutional_ gangof_50.
3. Omar El Akkad, Egypt's Draft Constitution Limits Role of Islam, THE GLOBE
AND MAIL (Aug. 30 2013), available at http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news
/world/egypts-draft-constitution-limits-role-of-islam/article14060190/.
4. Gamal Essam El Din, Fierce debates over preamble of Egypt's new constitution.
AHRAM ONLINE (Nov. 26, 2013), http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/87562.aspx.
5. Richard Palmer, Egypt's New Constitution More Islamic Than the Last, THE
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the - what we call - "Islamicity" of Egypt's constitution, one of the
members of the constitutional committee was quick to dismiss any
suggestion that the amended constitution of 2013 would be any less
Islamic than the previous one, and claimed that the committee does
not intend to "distort Egypt's Islamic identity whatsoever," adding,
"What is being said in this regard is nothing more than unfounded
speculation."6
The question of Islamicity of constitutions that this paper tackles
is of immense importance. In writing the new Egyptian Constitution,
drafters confronted that routine, age-old question of constitutional
design in the Muslim world: what role will Islam be given in this
newly drafted constitution? How will law-making be affected by the
adoption of Islam? Are constitutions in the Muslim world
establishing theocracies or liberal democracies? How does the
incorporation of Islam in a constitution affect the adoption of
constitutional rights? These questions are not only of great
importance in the Middle East today, but have remained an issue
during constitution-making exercises in the Muslim world.
Discussions about the future constitutional design of Syria have
already begun. Jordan has amended its constitutions in ways
designed to preserve its monarchy; Tunisia has just passed a new
constitution, and Libya and Yemen are in the middle of constitution-
making exercises. The question of Islam has remained of primary
salience in each of these constitutional design situations. Even in
Tunisia - one of the most secular countries in the Muslim world - one
question stood out: the role of Islam in the constitution.
In 2014, the question of Islamicity of constitutions also gained
particular prominence internationally when peace talks were
proposed between the governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan and
the Taliban. In the case of Pakistan, the militant group even refused
to accept peace talks under the framework of a constitution which, in
their view, was not Islamic.7 Hence, war and peace partly can
TRuMPET (July 13, 2013), available at http://www.thetrumpet.com/article/10805.19.0.0
/religion/islam/egypts-new-constitution-more-islamic-than-the-last.
6.Safaa Azaab, In Conversation with Kamal EI-Helbawy, ASHARQ AL AWSAT (Oct.
12, 2013), available at http://www.aawsat.net/2013/10/article55318241.
7. Dawood Ahmed, How "Islamic" is Pakistan's Constitution?, ICONNECT BLOG
(May 17, 2014), http://www.iconnectblog.com/2014/05/how-islamic-is-pakistans-
constitution/.
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sometimes hinge on the question of how Islamic a country's
constitution is.
This debate is not new: the status of Islam had similarly been a
major issue for US foreign policy in the process of producing the Iraqi
and Afghan constitutions.8 With regards to Iraq, Senator Richard
Lugar went so far as to publicly state that the United States could not
accept "a popularly elected theocracy," while one scholar
dismissingly referred to the newly written constitutions of both
countries - due to their incorporation of Islamic clauses - as
impositions of "theocracy."9 As Voll notes, "implicit in these
concerns is an assumption that an "Islamic" state, even if
democratically established, would be transformed into an illiberal
and undemocratic "theocracy."10 For these critics, the choice between
the constitutional inclusion of Islam and democracy or rights was a
zero-sum game: a constitution then, would have to make a choice
between the two.
In contrast to Western fears, in much of the Muslim world, the
idea of incorporating Islam in the/a constitutional-legal framework
still remains very popular.1 This became evident during the Arab
8. LARRY DIAMOND, SQUANDERED VICTORY: THE AMERICAN OCCUPATION AND
THE BUNGLED EFFORT TO BRING DEMOCRACY TO IRAQ 49 (2005) ("Any democratically
elected Iraqi government is unlikely to be secular, and unlikely to be pro-Israel. And
frankly, moderately unlikely to be pro-American") (quoting Noah Feldman's
description of the Bush administration's involvement in the Iraqi constitution);
Alexander Thier, Big Tent, Small Tent: The Making of a Constitution in Afghanistan, in
FRAMING THE STATE IN TIMES OF TRANSITION: CASE STUDIES IN CONSTITUTION MAKING
535, 543 -45 (Laurel E. Miller ed., 2006) (discussing UN and US involvement in the
Afghani constitution making process); Nusrat Chodhury, Comment, Constrained
Spaces for Islamic Feminism: Women's Rights and the 2004 Constitution of Afghanistan, 19
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 155, 156 (2007) ("The recent drafting and ratification of the
Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in 2003 and 2004 sparked
contentious debates over the compatibility of democratic governance, Islam, and
Islamic law.").
9. John 0. Voll, Islam and Democracy: Is Modernization a Barrier, 1 RELIGIOUS
COMPASS 170, 171 (2007) (quoting Richard Lugar); see also Hannibal Travis, Freedom
or Theocracy?: Constitutionalism in Afghanistan or Iraq, 3 NW. U.J.I.H.R.. 4, 4 (2005)
(arguing that Islamic constitutionalism cannot be democratic and that incorporating
Islam in the constitution will necessary be antithetical to human rights).
10. Voll, supra note 9, at 171.
11. Magali Rheault & Dalia Mogahed, Many Turks, Iranians, Egyptians Link
Sharia and Justice, GALLUP WORLD (July 25, 2008), at http://www.gallup.com/poll
/109072/many-turks-iranians-egyptians-link-sharia-justice.aspx.
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Spring. A recurrent slogan of protestors in the Arab Spring was "ash-
shab yurid isqat an-nizam," translated as "the people want to bring
down the regime." The protestors in the Arab Spring certainly
wanted democracy and rights. However, while outside observers
feared the rise of Constitutional Islam, the protestors did not want to
trade democracy for religion; that is, did not desire secular
government; which is often associated in the popular imagination in
Muslim countries with repression, colonialism and an assault on
Islam.12 Rather they wanted Islam and democracy. That is, even
though the Arab Spring movements were not by any means Islamist
in nature; the protestors were clamoring for freedom and justice as
Muslims and not against religion13. While they wanted Islam; they
also, overwhelmingly, desired democracy, rights and the rule of
law.14  Accordingly, foreign governments that assumed that
democratization would bring secular parties to power and encourage
a separation of religion and state, were disappointed as it became
apparent that instead, as democratization took hold in the Middle
East, it would be Islamic parties that would rise to power. Some
commentators even skeptically began to refer to the Arab Spring as
the "Islamist Spring."'5
In contrast, rather than downplaying the Islamicity of their
constitutions, leaders in the Muslim world seem to be boasting at how
Islamic their constitution will be. Sudan's leader, Omar Al-Bashir has
12. TARIQ RAMADAN, ISLAM AND THE ARAB AWAKENING 83 (2012) (reductive
readings of Islam and the role of Islam in resisting colonialism).
13. See generally id. at 15.
14. See Richard Wike, Pew Global Research Project: The Tahrir Square Legacy:
Egyptians Want Democracy, a Better Economy, and a Major Role for Islam (Jan. 24, 2013)
at http://www.pewglobal.org/2013/01/24/the-tahrirsquare-legacy-egyptians-wa
nt-democracy-a-better-economy-and-a-major-role-for-islam/.
15. See Heather Maher, Muslim Protests: Has Obama Helped Bring On an Anti-
U.S. 'Islamist Spring'?, THE ATLANTIC (Sept 23, 2012, 2:30 PM), available at
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/09/muslim-protests-has
-obama-helped-bring-on-an-anti-us-islamist-spring/262731/ (discussing Obama's
role in Islamist Spring); see also David Rohde, The Islamist Spring, REuTERs (Apr. 5,
2012), at http:/ /blogs.reuters.com/david-rohde/ 2012/04/05/the-islamist-spring/
(explaining that secular parties split and Islamists took control of politics in Tunisia
and Egypt); see generally John R. Bradley, AFTER THE ARAB SPRING: How ISLAMISTS
HIJACKED THE MIDDLE EAST REVOLTS (2012) (arguing that democracy introduced by
Arab Spring ultimately benefited Islamists).
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already promised his constituents a "100% Islamic" Constitution,16
the Syrian opposition wants a constitution based on Islam,'7 Libyan
leaders have suggested that the constitution will be "Islamic" and
"half of the debates" in the Tunisian National Constituent Assembly
have been about the status of Islam in Tunisia's constitution.8
Indeed, one of the promises of the Islamic parties is the full
implementation of sharia in their respective societies. The
constitution, as the most important legal document in the state,
becomes the primary focal point of exercising this demand.
Rather than greater democracy in the Muslim world leading to
the presumed marginalization of Islam, or the advance of
secularization, the reverse seems to be occurring. And this is not
surprising: secularism has never been popular in many parts of the
Muslim world. As The Economist states "most Muslims do not believe
in the separation of religion and state, as America and France do, and
have not lost their enthusiasm for religion, as many "Christian
Democrats" in Europe have."19 Unsurprisingly then, one of the
dominant promises of the Islamists elected to power after the Arab
Spring was the implementation of sharia in their respective societies.
As Professor Noah Feldman acknowledged in the case of Iraq, "as the
constitutional process became increasingly participatory and
democratic, the constitution itself became increasingly Islamic in
orientation and detail" and "more democracy meant more Islam."20
Indeed, as Professor Feldman writes elsewhere, "[w]here the country
is majority Muslim, many citizens will often want Islam to have some
official role in state governance, beyond mere symbolism"2' and that
16. Yara Bayoumy, Sudan Constitution To Be "100 Percent Islamic": Bashir,
REUTERS (July 8 2012), at http://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/07/07/uk-sudan-
constituion-idUKBRE8660IB20120707.
17. Oren Dorell, Syrian Rebels Said To Seek Islamic Democracy, USA TODAY, Sept.
24, 2012, available at http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/story/2012
/09/24/syrian-rebels-said-to-seek-islami c-democracy/57826584/1.
18. Robert Joyce, Tunisia's Neglected Constitution, CAIRO REVIEW OF GLOBAL
AFFAIRS, (Oct. 14, 2013), available at http://www.aucegypt.edu/GAPP/CairoReview
/Pages/articleDetails.aspx?aid=439.
19. The Uprisings: Islam and the Arab Revolutions, THE ECONOMIST (Mar. 31,
2011), available at http://www.economist.com/node/18486005.
20. See Noah Feldman & Roman Martinez, Constitutional Politics and Text in
the New Iraq: An Experiment in Islamic Democracy, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 883, 884 (2006).
21. Id. at 860.
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the Islamic democrats believe that "a majority of Muslim citizens
would choose government with an Islamic cast if they were free to do
80."22
Why would bringing Islam and sharia into the constitution and
political sphere be so popular in Muslim societies? Perhaps because
many Muslims associate sharia, good governance and rights as
indivisible and complementary. Muslims in several Muslim majority
countries consider a lack of Islam responsible for much of the political
corruption and lack of accountability that besieges many Muslim
countries. Indeed, the sharia is widely considered by some Muslims
to be the solution to their problems -as the Muslim Brotherhood's
slogan goes, "Islam is the Solution."23 Thus, while the idea of Islam
and Islamic law conjures up negative connotations in the West, for
Muslims, according to Professor Feldman, it is Islam that continues
to "invoke the core idea of law in terms that resonate deeply with the
Islamic past."24
Polls conducted by Pew and Gallup routinely attest to the fact
that vast majorities in Muslim societies desire to see Islam embedded
in their constitutional and legislative framework. In fact, for
Muslims, sharia itself is analogized as a sort of constitution, holding
rulers accountable for transgressions and corruption, to God's law.
In the public consultations during the constitutional drafting process
in Egypt in 1971, Kristen Stilt writes that it was apparent that those
who desired to see Islam and rights associated the two as linked.25
We also know from polls that the majority of Muslims who desire that
Islam be a source of legislation do so, because they associate many
positive rights to Islam -and these rights overlap with modem day
human rights norms. For example, a majority of those polled believe
that incorporating Islam as a source of law would mean a provision
of justice for women, constraining government, a reduction in
22. Id. at 864.
23. Kristen Stilt, "Islam is the Solution": Constitutional Visions of The Egyptian
Muslim Brotherhood, 46 TEX. INT'L L.J. 73, 73-108 (2010).
24. See Noah Feldman, THE FALL AND RISE OF THE ISLAMIC STATE 2 (2008)
(discussing increasing tendency for governments in majority-Muslim countries to
declare themselves Islamic and apply Sharia).
25. See generally Kristen Stilt, Constitutions in Authoritarian Regimes: The
Egyptian Constitution of 1971, in CONSTITUTIONS IN AUrHORITARIAN REGIMES 111 (Tom
Ginsburg & Alberto Simpser eds., 2014) (tracing the history of Egypt's constitution).
20151
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corruption, the protection of minorities, human rights and a fair
judicial system. Even in secular Turkey, less than a third of
Muslims-who want Islamic law to be a source of legislation-
perceive it to limit personal freedom; thus, it could very well be that
the demands for rights and Islam are motivated by the same forces.26
Secularism in the constitution, in contrast, has only limited appeal in
many Muslim countries. Secularism is seen as unacceptable to many
Muslims, even if some elites in the region desired it and saw it as
necessary.27 As one writer has commented, "Muslim thinkers [find]
it very difficult to understand new ideas like secularism in isolation
from Christian (Western colonial) supremacy." Secularism is
perceived as a means to rid the state of religion completely-to
remove God from the public space-a goal which is intolerable for
many Muslims. And there is of course another reason for its low
legitimacy: politics. Secular-styled governments ranging from
Nasser in Egypt, to the Shah in Iran and Bourguiba in Tunisia
happened to be very dictatorial regimes. Indeed, even in Turkey-
the most secular of all Muslim majority countries-the charm of
secularism has been waning in the face of popular politics.2
With this in mind, and as the idea of an "Islamic constitution,"
where state and religion are fused, gains even more popular traction
and can sometimes make the difference between war and peace, it
becomes immensely important to understand "Constitutional
Islamization" from an empirical perspective. But, to date, there is
little empirical or systematic scholarship on Constitutional
Islamization.29 In particular, there is no account as to why we observe
26. Rheault, supra note 11.
27. Khaled Abou El Fadl, The Centrality of Shari'ah to Government and
Constitutionalism in Islam, in CONSTITUTIONALISM IN ISLAMIC COUNTRIES: BETWEEN
UPHEAVAL AND CONTINUITY 35, 55 - 56 (Rainer Grote & Tilmann J. Roder eds., 2012)
(discussing the unviability of secularism in Muslim countries because of its
symbolism as a Western intellectual invasion among other reasons).
28. See BRIAN J. GRIM & ROGER FINKE, THE PRICE OF FREEDOM DENIED: RELIGIOUS
PERSECUTION AND CONFLICT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 167 (2011) (discussing
popular interest in bringing Islam to secular Turkish government); see also Nazih N.
M. Ayubi, The Political Revival of Islam: The Case of Egypt, 12 INTL. J. MIDDLE E. STUD.
481, 487 (1980) (describing a general turning away from secularism in Middle East).
29. But see Clark B. Lombardi & Nathan J. Brown, Do Constitutions Requiring
Adherence to Shari'a Threaten Human Rights? How Egypt's Constitution Reconciles Islamic
Law with the Liberal Rule of Law, 21 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 379 (2006); NATHAN J. BROWN,
[Vol. 38:1
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variation throughout the Islamic world regarding whether or not the
constitution is Islamized or which constitutions are most Islamized.
This gap exists despite the fact that the "Muslim world's desire for
enacting these clauses shows no sign of abating."30
This is not to say that there is no scholarship. Certainly, in the
area of comparative constitutional law, scholars have recently
described how courts have moderated this potential tension,
specifically focusing on the 'benign' judicial interpretation of Islamic
supremacy clauses. Nathan Brown and Clark Lombardi, citing the
example of Egypt, suggest that constitutions that incorporate Islam
may not in fact threaten human rights since a progressive judiciary
can interpret laws in a progressively compatible way.31 Similarly,
Ran Hirschl has written extensively about the means by which judges
across the Muslim world have mitigated the potential illiberal effects
of incorporating religion within constitutions - or "constitutional
theocracy."32 On the other hand, Intisar Rabb has critiqued some of
these positions. Yet, even as the concept of an "Islamic" constitution
CONSTITUTIONS IN A NONCONSTITUTIONAL WORLD: ARAB BASIC LAWS AND THE
PROSPECTS FOR ACCOUNTABLE GOVERNMENT 107-10, 161-93 (2001) (tracing
historiography of idea that the origin of Western constitutionalism lies in Christianity
and the history of the role of shari'a in Middle Eastern governance); FELDMAN, FALL
AND RISE, supra note 24, at 103- 40 (exploring the emergence of modern Islamism and
its constitutional proposals); see generally Clark Lombardi, Sharia Incorporated: A
Comparative Overview of the Legal Systems of Twelve Muslim Countries in Past and
Present, 28 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 733, (description of sharia clauses as a source of
legislation); Jan Michiel Otto, Sharia and Law in a Bird's-Eye View: Reform, Moderation
and Ambiguity, in DELICATE DEBATES ON ISLAM 74 (Jan Michiel Otto and Hannah
Mason eds., 2011) (examining the changing role of sharia over time in 12 Muslim
countries); Dawood I. Ahmed & Tom Ginsburg, Constitutional Islamization and Human
Rights: The Surprising Origin and Spread of Islamic Supremacy in Constitutions, 54 VA. J.
INT'L L. (forthcoming 2014).
30. Lombardi and Brown, supra note 29, at 381 (discussing growing
popularity of constitutional Islamization).
31. Id.
32. Id. (using Egypt as a case study to examine the difficulties courts face in
interpreting Constitutional Islamization and the effects on human rights and the
economy); Clark B. Lombardi, Designing Islamic constitutions: Past Trends and Pptions
for a Democratic Future, 11 INT'LJ. CONST. L 615, 627 (2013) (Iraqi Supreme Court finds
clauses nonjusticiable); see generally RAN HIRSCHL, CONSTITUTIONAL THEOCRACY
(2010) (arguing that encompassing religion in constitutionalism, i.e., "constitutional
theocracy," has allowed opponents of theocracy to .maintain order through religious
rhetoric without an actual theocracy).
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is brandied about with increasing frequency today by policy makers,
commentators and scholars alike -no one has to date surveyed the
constitutional landscape to exhaustively identify the prevalence of
Islamic features in constitutions, nor asked just how Islamic are the
constitutions of Muslim countries are, or which Muslim country has
the most Islamic constitution? That is, we find that there is no
empirical analysis of Islamicity in constitutions, despite the immense
political importance of the question.
This Article fills the gap: relying on a unique dataset based on
the coding of in-force national constitutions of countries that are
members of the Organisation of Islamic Co-operation (OIC), it
surveys the global landscape of constitutions of Muslim countries:
from Uzbekistan to Saudi Arabia, from Iran to Somalia -and charts
out the universe of "Constitutional Islamization." In doing so, it
develops a novel index -the Islamic Constitutions Index (ICI) that
measures and ranks the constitutions of all Muslim majority countries
according to "Islamicity."33 In doing so, it seeks to measure not only
how well countries' constitutions live up to the popular ideal of being
an Islamic constitution but also tests the popular assumption that the
constitutional incorporation of Islamic law is necessarily antithetical
to human rights and democracy. Questions this Article tackles
include, just how Islamic are the constitutions of Muslim majority
countries today? What types of Islamic clauses exist? How do
constitutions incorporate Islam? What types of constitutional clauses
relating to Islam are most popular in the Muslim world? What
regions have the most Islamic constitutions? It also answers the
puzzle: Which is the most and least Islamic constitution in the Muslim
world?
Ultimately, the goal of this Article is to illuminate and measure
the world of "Constitutional Islamization" for academics and
policymakers alike empirically, so as to resolve a major tension
during constitution-making in the Muslim world and lay the
foundations for an ambitious empirical research agenda that further
33. We acknowledge that developing and using indicators and rankings to
understand and conceptualize complex socio-legal phenomena is a risky exercise and
therefore significant caution should be exercised when relying on such tools
conclusively for policy making. See generally Tom Ginsburg, Pitfalls of Measuring the
Rule of Law 3 HAGUE J. RULE OF L. 269 (2011).
[Vol. 38:1
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illustrates the relationship between political Islam and democracy.
Further, we hope that providing empirical evidence on the Islamicity
of constitutions will assist fragile democracies during peace-making
efforts with groups such as the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban that
have as their central goal, the establishment of an Islamic constitution.
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I provides a brief history
of the relationship between constitutionalism and Islam in the
Muslim world. Part II elaborates on Islamic law or sharia and the core
theoretical framework of "Islamic Constitutionalism." Part III sets
out the conceptual framework of our analysis by introducing the
model Islamic constitution - a hitherto under-researched,
comprehensive "model" Islamic constitution developed by Al-Azhar
University in Egypt; an institution widely considered as one of the
most authoritative sources of Islamic rules and jurisprudence in the
Sunni Muslim world. It is this model against which we assess global
constitutionalism for its Islamicity. Part IV introduces our empirical
methodology and elaborates our findings about the universe of
Islamic constitutions. It captures the universe of Islamic clauses
found in constitutions and ranks Muslim country constitutions in
terms of their Islamicity - that is, the most and least Islamic
constitutions in the world. It also identifies regional patterns
regarding Islamicity in constitutions and charts the trajectory of Islam
in the world's constitutions temporally. Part V concludes the Article.
I. The Origins of "Islamic Constitutions"
A. Liberal Leanings and Moral Standings-Islamic
Constitutionalism
In the past century, religion seems to have witnessed a marked
resurgence in law and government.34 This revival has been witnessed
across the globe, in regions spreading "from central and southeast
Asia to north and sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East."35 In the
case of Muslim countries, beginning with the 1970s, widespread calls
34. See generally RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND
CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM (2008); see generally PETER BERGER,
THE DESECULARIZATION OF THE WORLD (1999); see generally GILLES KEPEL, THE REVENGE
OF GOD (1994).
35. Ran Hirschl, The Theocratic Challenge to Constitution Drafting in Post-Conflict
States 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1179, 1179 (2008).
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for the implementation of Islamic law were observed.36 In terms of
constitutional design, while a number of constitutions globally
contain a state religion clause, constitutions in Muslim-majority
countries privileged religion even more robustly.37 Many Muslim
countries, including Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Yemen, and the
United Arab Emirates, have adopted constitutions that entrenched
Islam or Islamic law (sharia) as a source, a primary source or the
primary source for legislation. Since 1980, the Egyptian Constitution
has provided that "principles of Islamic law are the principal source
of legislation."38 Similarly, the Iraqi Constitution states that "Islam
. . . is a fundamental source of legislation."39  Some of these
constitutions went a step further and provided for so-called
"repugnancy clauses." In Pakistan, Afghanistan, Egypt, Iran, and
Iraq, for example, it is constitutionally forbidden to enact legislation
that is antithetical to Islam. The Constitution of Pakistan requires that
"no law shall be enacted which is repugnant o Islam."40 The Afghan
Constitution similarly demands that "no law can be contrary to the
beliefs and provisions of the sacred religion of Islam."41 Some
Muslim countries require that the head of state or government must
be Muslim, while others simply make references to their Islamic
identity in their preamble.
So where and how did this demand for Islam arise in constitution
writing in the Muslim world? The story goes like this: during the 19th
century, autocratic rulers in parts of the Muslim world faced fiscal
stress and political tensions. As once powerful Muslim polities faced
almost certain decline, reformers within the system saw within a
36. SAMI ZUBAIDA, LAW AND POWER IN THE ISLAMIC WORLD, 1 (2003) (explaining
the Islamic revival in the 1970s calling for application of shari'a in a system of
government); see SAID AMIR ARJOMAND, Introduction in CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN
THE MIDDLE EAST: WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO TURKEY, IRAQ, IRAN AND AFGHANISTAN,
at 3 (Said Amir Arjomand ed., 2008).
37. See, e.g., DANMARKS RIGEs GRUNDLOV [CONSTITUTION] June 5, 1953, § 4
(Den.); see also, e.g., STJORNARSKRA L'iDVELDISINS iSLANDS [CONSTITUTION] June 17,
1944, Art. 62 (Ice.).
38. PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT Mar. 30, 2011,
art. 2; CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT Sept. 11, 1971, Art. 2.
39. IRAQ CONSTITUTION Oct. 15, 2005, Art. 2.
40. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN 1973 Art. 227.
41. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN Jan. 26, 2004,
art. 3.
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written constitution a partial means to arrest this decline. Emulation
of Western political ideas and norms was considered necessary if the
Empire was to reform itself. Accordingly, armed with a desire to
ensure fiscal and political accountability and for rejuvenating a once
powerful Muslim polity, while not giving up Islamic heritage,
reformers in the Muslim world began experimenting with the
"technology" of European written constitutionalism.
However, prior to written constitutionalism, it was sometimes
Islamic law which had historically existed partially as a kind of
natural, higher law "constitution" that constrained and limited
temporal authority in some parts of the Muslim world.42 The doctrine
of siyasa sharia had an "enormous impact on the political philosophy
of the Ottoman state."43 According to the doctrine, to ensure laws
were considered legitimate, "the ruler would have to consult with
classical Islamic jurists and.., ensure that.., edicts must not require
Muslims to perform acts that these jurists deemed forbidden and
[did] not cause general harm to society by impeding the goals that
Islamic jurists accepted as goals of the law."44  Accordingly,
governments in some parts of the Muslim world had the power to
make and apply laws; as long as they did not violate sharia and were
in the public interest.45 In light of the existence of such constraints
upon government, scholars of Islam explicitly recognized the
congruence between sharia and natural law; 46 some even argued that
sharia had certain features that might make it more constitutionalist
than a positive, man-made, constitutional order.47
While early Western scholarship traced the roots of
constitutionalism to natural law doctrines in Christianity and
Judaism, surprisingly "Islam, despite its strong legal orientation,
42.See FELDMAN, FALL AND RISE, supra note 24, at 2 (discussing increasing
tendency for governments in majority-Muslim countries to declare themselves
Islamic and apply Sharia).
43. Lombardi and Brown, supra note 30, at 404- 05.
44. Id.
45. JAN MICHIEL OTTO, SHARIA AND NATIONAL LAW IN MUSLIM COUNTRIES:
TENSIONS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR DUTCH AND EU FOREIGN POLICY 11 (2008).
46. See BROWN, CONSTITUTIONS IN A NONCONSTITUTIONAL WORLD, supra note
29, at 108 (discussing the debate about the analogy between Islamic shari'a and either
constitutional law or natural law).
47. See id. at 170 (discussing the idea that shari'a is more constitutionalist than
anything a constituent assembly could create).
2015]
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
provoked no [similar] interest."48  This is despite the fact, as
Professors Esposito and Voll note, that the Islamic heritage contains
a number of fundamental concepts that can support constitutionalism
in the Islamic world - consensus, consultation, limits on arbitrary
governmental power, limited sovereignty of the ruler, social contract
and separation of powers.49 Nevertheless, some Western scholars
perceived that Islam, as a non-Western religion, could not have
espoused values compatible with those of the Enlightenment.50 In
contrast, in recognition of the constitutionalist functions that sharia
envisaged, some Muslim countries enacted positive legislation only for
certain issues: rather, law and the limits of temporal authority in
government were for certain issues organically derived from the
various schools of sharia.51
Yet, once it was decided that modernity required constitutional
democracy along the European model, Islam's previous role in
governance had to be realigned and reconfigured to fit the emergence
of the "modern" nation-state. Islamic tools of governance were thus
"modernized" and reframed as constitution makers in the Muslim
world blended Islamic rhetoric into written constitutions - or
engaged in what we refer to today as - "Constitutional Islamization."
Confronted with a pervasive European orientalism that viewed the
Ottoman Empire as the embodiment of despotism,5 2 reformers and
48. See id. at 108.
49. JOHN L. ESPOSITO & JOHN 0. VOLL, ISLAM AND DEMOCRACY 51 (1996)
(discussing aspects of Islamic heritage that support democratization like consensus,
consultation, constitutional opposition, and limits on arbitrary government); see also
Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Constitutionalism in Islamic Countries: A Contemporary
Perspective of Islamic Law, in CONSTITUTIONALISM IN ISLAMIC COUNTRIES, supra note 27,
at 20 (Islamic heritage -compatible with constitutionalism like rule of law,
consultation, separation of powers, and limited government); but see ELIE KEDOURIE,
DEMOCRACY AND ARAB POLITICAL CULTURE 5 (1992) (The idea of representation,
elections, popular suffrage, political institutions being regulated by laws laid down
by a parliamentary assembly, laws being guarded and upheld by an independent
judiciary, and ideas of the secularity of state are all profoundly alien to the Muslim
political tradition).
50. See RAMADAN, supra note 12, at 13 (Western governments support Arab
dictatorships rather than Islamist political movements).
51. See PAUL MARSHALL, RADICAL ISLAM'S RULES: THE WORLDWIDE SPREAD OF
EXTREME SHARI'A LAW 12 (2005) (discussing the lack of legislation in many Islamic
jurisdictions in favor of shari'a).
52. See generally, Ash Cirakman, From Tyranny to Despotism: The
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conservatives alike began integrating religious modes of governance
into a modern form. Beginning with Tunisia in 1861, states in the
Islamic world adopted the form of Western constitutions.53 Yet, they
also sought to render political authority accountable to Islamic law in
an attempt to develop a constitutionalist system that would be
indigenous.5 4 That is, they attempted to write constitutions that were
Islamic, rendering authority accountable to the sharia.55
Constitutionalist ideas were accordingly fashioned in Islamic
rhetoric, to ensure not only that Islam was not being side-lined, but
also that constitutional reforms would be considered more acceptable
and legitimate. Unsurprisingly, Islam provided a familiar,
indigenous anchor for rooting potentially alien change within the
framework of society's own cultural identity. Since that period about
a century and a half ago, the Islamic world has continually wrestled
with a rather nuanced relationship between the norms of religion and
the core ideas of modern constitutionalism. As Schacht argues, even
today, law "remains an important, if not the most important, element
in the struggle which is being fought in Islam between traditionalism
and modernism under the impact of Western Ideas."56
B. A Tale of Four Monarchies: Tunisia, Ottoman Empire, Egypt
and Iran
In Tunisia, where the Muslim world's first modern constitution
was written, Islam's role in the constitution-making process is
particularly instructive. The insertion of Islamic rhetoric to formulate
Enlightenment's Unenlightened Image of the Turks, INT'L. J. MIDDLE E. STUD. 49 (2001)
(describing the tendency of European writers to describe the Ottoman government
as despotic and tyrannical).
53. See MALIKA ZEGHAL, SACRED POLITICS: THE STATE AND ISLAM IN THE
CONTEMPORARY MIDDLE EAST (forthcoming 2015); Intissar Kherigi, Al Jazeera: Tunisia:
The Calm After the Storm, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Nov. 28, 2011), at http:
/ /www.cfr.org/tunisia/al-jazeera-tunisia-calm-after-storm/p26744 (discussing
that 150 years after signing of Arab world's first constitution in 1861, Tunisia finally
has an independent, elected body to draw up a new constitution).
54. See BROWN, supra note 29, at 20 (examining treatise on government by
leading Tunisian politician of the constitutional period Khayr al-Din al-Tunisi, who
wrote about the importance of restraining state power and ruler accountability); Cf.
Fourth Draft of Constitution of Tunisia (2013) (on file with author) (example of
constitution without any provision on Islamic law).
55. BROWN, supra note 29, at 52.
56. JOSEPH SCHACHT, AN INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC LAW 1 (1964).
2015]
Hastings Intl & Comp. L. Rev.
the constitution was seen as a strategic tool employed by reformers
to ease the insertion of reforms perceived as "Western" into the
political milieu; particularly to legitimate these "alien" reforms in the
eyes of the religious elites and conservatives that would resist such
efforts. Ideas about constitutionalism entered the political scene just
as Western, European, colonial dominance-in material and fiscal
terms especially - was being cemented within the region. The British
and French had growing privileges within the province of Tunis. In
fact, their nationals and even sometimes religious minorities would
be subject to their "consular jurisdiction" -that is, a separate legal
and justice system that existed outside the authority of the Tunisian
authorities even as they geographically resided in Tunisia. This
"legal exceptionalism" created significant resentment within the
Muslim population in Tunisia. Emphasizing a difference or contrast
between Muslim political thought and "European" thought helped
Europeans as well as Tunisians to make sense of the friction and
unequal and asymmetrical political relations between them. A
narrative of "We are Islamic" gained steady ground. Accordingly,
the Tunisian Constitution of 1861 -also known as the Qanun Ul
Dawla - opened with reference to God and to sharia which
guarantees security.57 The King had to give an oath in the name of
God to the Grand Council - an advisory body and shari'a court.
Members of the Grand Council -the parliamentary advisory body -
were also referred to in Islamic terminology, as ahl al-hall wa-l-aqd,
literally the people who loose and bind and the population were
referred to as na'ayana - or our flock.58
It is telling that the first constitution in the Muslim world -of
Tunisia-was drafted under the combined pressures of the British
and French Consuls. This is not surprising since, the region had
become a pawn and site of -as with other Muslim countries such as
Iran and Afghanistan -diplomatic tussle between European powers.
In Tunisia, France and Great Britain competed for economic and
political clout in Tunisia by seeking economic concessions, as was the
case in Iran, between the British and Russians. The two countries also
had competing political aims; the French wanted Tunisia to be
isolated from the Ottomans, while the British wanted to reinforce the
57. See ZEGHAL, supra note 53.
58. See BROWN, supra note 29, at 16.
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relationship between the bey of Tunisia and the Ottomans. For the
French, the constitution was a means to limit the perceived absolute
authority of the monarchical government- absolutism was to be
converted into a constitutional monarchy.5 9 However, alongside the
French, there was also a cadre of Muslim reformers - Khayr Al Din
most notable amongst hem - desperate to see political accountability
and the progression of their nation. He wrote that the ruler needed
to be restrained and that "it was necessary to check him either in the
form of a heavenly shari'a or a policy based on reason . . . it is
incumbent upon the ulema [scholars] and the notables of the umma
[Muslim community] to resist evil." 60 These reformers disliked the
absolute power of the bey and desired a better legal and
administrative system. According to another reformer, Ibn Diyaf, the
absolute power of the monarch had been very damaging for Tunisia;
and while sharia was one tool to control against a monarch's absolute
power -it alone was not sufficient.
The qanun - or law - not derived from the sharia, could be a
valuable medium to set such limits. Ibn Diyaf accordingly developed
the notion of a "government bounded by law." He argued that
government in Muslim societies had become absolutist and corrupt.
This was partly because religious scholars -who historically served
as a check on the ruler -were no longer fulfilling their task of using
temporal law to limit arbitrariness. Even the French Consul agreed
with this; writing to his superior, he described the Tunisian
government as capricious and arbitrary; Muslim in name, but not
following the Islamic principles of good governance.61 To this end,
the Europeans and Muslim reformers had a common agenda in
constitutionalism -to the extent that it limited authority, improved
governance and provided rights to Tunisians. Over time, this
Western-Islamic dichotomy, assisted by power asymmetries between
the East and West, between colonial people and colonial powers,
cemented into a deeper narrative of European -and today, Western
values -verses Islamic values.62 In fact, the European press played
on this apparent dichotomy between European, "liberal" values, and
59. See ZEGHAL, supra note 53, at 19.
60. See BROWN, supra note 29, at 16.
61. See ZEGHAL, supra note 53, at 43.
62. Id.
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Islam. In the popular European imagination, the constitution was
"proof that Islam could accept the values of the Enlightenment. The
influential French Journal des Debats saw the constitution as the sign
of "good progress" and a model for other Muslim countries. A
constitution made the state "civilized" and its Prince "as liberal as he
is enlightened."63
We see a similar pattern developing in the Ottoman Empire in
the mid-19th-century. From 1826 to 1877, the Ottoman government
desperately tried to modernize to revitalize its empire that had
stopped expanding after failing to defeat European forces at Vienna.
Amongst other problems, the economy was in decline and tensions
were also mounting between different ethnicities. Pressure was also
mounting with regards to Europe's expanding and competing
capitalism. European countries were seeking new markets and zones
of influence and required reforms necessary for such capitalist
expansion, such as commercial laws. An emerging system of foreign
privileges, immunity, and interventions was on the rise.
Additionally, to finance modernization, the government had
borrowed heavily and this led to further fiscal problems and foreign
domination.64 During this crisis, a group of reformers sought to
restore the legacy of their nation and believed that the adoption of
"Western" style governance- including a constitution- with Islamic
characteristics would provide the most appropriate tools for
improving the future of a chaotic, declining empire and in turn,
constraining the power of the Sultan.65 Indeed, as "crisis followed
crisis the liberals became convinced that the safety, if not the very
existence of the Empire lay in a radical reshaping of its government
structure. Above all they perceived a need to end the absolute rule of
the sultan and to substitute a constitutional form of government."66
Thus a series of reforms preceding the constitution were
promulgated in 1839, labeled Tanzimat; literally meaning
reorganization - the goal of which was to reform the Ottoman Empire
under the guidance of Westernization and protect it against
nationalist movements and foreign powers. Tanzimat was based on
63. Id.
64. See BROWN, supra note 29, at 21.
65. Id. at 25.
66. Id.
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the adoption of European political modernity within Ottoman
institutions and bureaucracy. The establishment of a military was the
Tanzimat's first priority. The second priority was the establishment
of the empire's administrative apparatus, which was the main focus
of Ottoman reformers from 1839 onwards. 1839 was also the year the
first Tanzimat edict, Hatt-i-Sharif of the Gulhane, was issued. Amongst
other changes, the reforms attempted to integrate non-Muslims and
non-Turks by enhancing their civil liberties and granting them legal
equality. Laws were promulgated regulating, "Ottoman affiliation"
(meaning citizenship) in 1869 and the reorganization of the judiciary:
which was divided between Islamic, communitarian, and secular
courts. Additional laws were issued to organize matters of trade,
official transactions, registration of land, municipalities and their
powers.
The constitution was perhaps the major tool of reform. A
"committee was appointed which consisted of military officials,
religious scholars and government officials. A group of senior
officials, military leaders and ulema were appointed to draft the
constitution. The draft they finally submitted to the Sultan most
closely resembled the Belgian constitution of 1831; others noted
parallels with the Prussian constitution."67  The constitution
introduced some measures to check absolute rule; the sultan could
not unilaterally enact laws or amend the constitution. In addition, it
created a legislative body, guaranteed personal liberty, and assured
religious freedoms. Free education became a right and equality
before the law -irrespective of religion, caste or creed-was
guaranteed. The courts were granted independence. A free press was
also provided for and a weak bicameral parliament was instituted,
whereby there would be an elected house as well as an appointed
senate. Ministers were principally responsible to the Sultan, but
parliament could try them for criminal offenses, with the Sultan's
permission. Despite its novel nature -being the second constitution
in the Muslim world - again, Islamic idiom was a recurring feature in
the constitution. Article 4 appointed "His Majesty the Sultan, under
the title of "Supreme Caliph," [as] the protector of the Muslim
religion. Article 11 proclaimed Islam at the state religion. Article 7
tasks the Sultan with carrying out the provisions of the Islamic law.
67. Id. at 21.
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Affairs touching the sharia were also exclusively the prerogative of
sharia tribunals. It was quite apparent that part of the reason for
using Islam in the constitution was that drafters wished to legitimate
positive, man-made legislation-a feature of modern political
systems -alongside divine sharia.68 In fact, when the constitution
was resurrected in 1908- after its earlier abandonment only two
years after promulgation -the constitution now required the Sultan
to swear an oath to sharia alongside the nation, constitution and
homeland.
In Egypt, like Tunisia and the Ottoman Empire, we see a
somewhat identical set of circumstances. The country was bankrupt
and heavily afflicted by European dominance -politically and
financially;69 the extent of this was such that French and British
ministers had been inducted into the Egyptian cabinet. As political
and military resentment built up, the Khedive (ruler), keen to counter
European influence, encouraged the writing of a constitution. Like
Tunisia and the Ottoman Empire, a group of reformers -from the
political elite mainly-saw a constitution as a way to make
government more accountable and responsible and so the 1882
Constitution was promulgated.
The fourth country in the Muslim world to write a formal
constitution during that period was Iran. It is also, historically, the
first constitution to contain the most robust constitutional
entrenchment of Islam. The constitution was written in
circumstances similar to Egypt, Tunisia and the Ottoman Empire.
During the course of the 19th century Iran had become economically
and militarily weaker. Reliance on cash crops, increasing export of
raw materials and the growing rate of unemployment had
contributed to this economic situation and also raised questions of
modernization in parallel with debates about how to curb the impact
of European commerce on Iran's economy.70 Janet Afary cites these
68. Id. at 24.
69. Id. at 26-27.
70. See JANET AFARY, THE IRANIAN CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION, 1906-1911:
GRASSROOTS DEMOCRACY, SOCIAL DEMOCRACY AND THE ORIGINS OF FEMINISM 17 (1996)
(detailing the origin of the Constitutional Revolution of 1906 in the structural and
ideological transformations at the turn of the century, resulting from decades of
economic change and damaging European influence).
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transformations as being the Constitutional Revolution.71 Externally
too, Iran, had become significantly dependent on European powers -
namely Britain and Russia. Rather than resist foreign domination, the
monarchs of the Qajar dynasty had quite visibly succumbed to British
and Russian pressure and by the late nineteenth century, Iran was
essentially "a prisoner of imperial interests."72
As more and more resentment built-up, an uprising that came to
be known later as the "Constitutional Revolution" erupted. The
central demand of the varied group of protestors in the Constitutional
Revolution was for the rule of law and establishment of
representative government. Since 186073 there had been a recurring
demand amongst many Iranians for a House of Justice -adalatkhana
that would dispense justice in contrast to the arbitrary justice
delivered by the Qajars.74 After months of incessant agitation by a
cross-section of Iranian society: clergy, traders, peasants and
merchants; the Iranian monarch, Muzaffar al-Din Shah capitulated
and signed a proclamation for constitutional government in August
1906. This declaration marked Iran's transition from an absolutist
monarchy to a parliamentary government.
Yet, it had become clear that not only was the constitution of 1906
causing much consternation amongst various elements of Iranian
society, it was also textually incomplete. While it recognized the
people as the source of political power, contained numerous rights
and set-up a division of powers75 - there was no bill of rights, nor
were the limits to the authority of the executive, legislative, and
71. Id. (detailing the origin of the Revolution in the structural and ideological
transformations at the turn of the century, resulting from decades of economic
change and damaging European i fluence).
72. Ali Gheissari, Constitutional Rights and the Development of Civil Law in Iran,
1907-41, in IRAN'S CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION: POPULAR POLITICS, CULTURAL
TRANSFORMATIONS AND TRANSNATIONAL CONNECTIONS 69, 71 (H.E. Chehabi &
Vanessa Martin eds., 2010).
73. See MARTIN, supra note 137, at 76 (discussing 1860 reorganization of the
Ministry of Justice and ulama request for adalatkhana, or courts of justice).
74. See Afray, supra note 70, at 57 (examining the public cry for majles that
were "national" not "Islamic").
75. See ASGHAR SCHIRAzI, THE CONSTITUTION OF IRAN: POLITICS AND THE STATE
IN THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC 19 (1997) (discussing Constitutional Revolution which
produced the first Iranian constitution that separated judicial, executive, and
legislative branches of government).
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judicial branches of government clearly defined. Thus work
immediately started on a supplementary constitution, which would
solidify the gains of the constitutional revolution and fill gaps in the
earlier constitution. In 1907, a supplementary constitution was
written, which contained an extensive bill of rights. Property, life
domicile, privacy regarding letters and telegrams, and the right to
trial were to be respected. Unlike its predecessor, the 1906
constitution, Islam was entrenched deeply in the 1907 constitution;
this was partly a result of an agreement whereby the Majlis delegates
had agreed that a committee of leading clerics would review and
rewrite articles of the 1906 constitution that were in conflict with
Islamic law.76 Article 2 of the 1907 supplementary constitution thus
called for the establishment of a Council of Clerics - an Islamic review
mechanism. The constitution also included a repugnancy clause
which stated that laws ratified by the Majlis could not be at variance
with the sharia. Article 2 of the constitution declared that "laws
passed by [the National Assembly] must never to all ages be contrary
to the sacred precepts of Islam and the laws laid down by the
Prophet." This was the first repugnancy clause in the constitutional
history of Muslim countries and it thus bears credit for introducing
the very language of repugnancy that would migrate transnationally
into future constitutions. The clause was certainly an innovation, not
just amongst the handful of relatively independent Muslim majority
states that actually had a written constitution at the time -Tunisia,
Egypt, Ottoman Empire, but also amongst other constitutions of the
world.
Framing today's demand for Islamic constitutionalism within
this historical predicament seems like a natural continuation; it is
certainly not surprising that the idea of an "Islamic" politico-
constitutional order remains popular even as modernity gains
76. See Afary, supra note 70 at 89 (arguing that the concept of "freedom" was
generally ignored in the 1907 constitution. This is not surprising "since many
members of the 'ulama continued to oppose the notion of freedom, and the word
soon adopted a highly pejorative connotation." Freedom, including the right to be
different and to act differently from other people, was equated with non-religiosity,
immorality, lack of chastity, and licentious behavior. With regard to gender, words
such as freedom and liberation had come to have a doubly negative connotation. For
example, a "free woman" meant a vulgar, immoral, and sexually promiscuous
one."); Id. at 220.
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credibility in the public imagination. Since the time of these early
constitutional experiments in the Muslim world, the issue of Islam in
constitutions has tended to remain a central issue of constitutional
design, both for the Muslim world and for Western observers. As
soon as Muslim countries started to gain independence post-
colonialism during the 20th century, they were keen not only to write
constitutions signaling their sovereignty, independence and provide
a framework of governance, but also to incorporate Islam into these
constitutions. Inevitably, Constitutional Islamization spread as
several countries blended Islam and constitutionalism. For example,
in 1947, during constitution-making in Pakistan, debates raged about
where sovereignty lay and how Islam would be the foundation of the
constitutional state. Similarly in Syria, at around the same time, there
were similar debates about incorporating Islam. Thus, in many
newly formed Muslim-majority countries too, constitutionalism has
increasingly been aligned with-and seen to reference Islam and
Islamic law. Accordingly, many constitutions in Muslim-majority
countries today contain some notion of Islam and sharia ranging from
the more strict versions of Iran and Pakistan, to the more lenient in
Algeria, Bangladesh and Malaysia. Even today, for governments in
the Muslim world, the adoption of Islamic law in the legal system and
subsequent application is not only an indicator of religiosity of a
Muslim country, but also allows for a veneer of legitimacy of rule, for
both democrats and dictators alike. To be sure, while sharia is not all
that defines constitutional aspirations in Muslim countries, nor is it
true that Islam is the source of all political legitimacy for Muslims, it
is certainly an extremely important feature of any constitutional order
for many Muslims.
II. Sharia and Islamic Constitutionalism
While the last section provides us with a historical, on the ground
perspective, of the Muslim world's engagement and experimentation
with constitutionalism, the theoretical and doctrinal foundation of
"Islamic constitutionalism" or what Islamic theology says about
constitutionalism is far older. And, to fully understand Islamic
Constitutionalism, it is important to introduce Islam and importantly,
Islamic law or, sharia, which forms the basis of the Islamic legal
system. This section engages in such an elaboration.
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A. Islamic Law
Islam, the faith of over 1.5 billion Muslims today, dates back to
the seventh century. It was founded by Prophet Muhammad, who
Muslims consider to be the final messenger; continuing the tradition
of earlier monotheistic faiths of Judaism and Christianity. In Arabic,
sharia means the clear, well-trodden "path to water." In Islamic
terminology, however, it is used to refer to matters of religion that
God has legislated for Muslims. The principal source of sharia is the
Quran, which is the holy scripture of the Islamic faith and is
understood to be the word of God as revealed to Prophet
Muhammad. A secondary source for sharia is the Sunnah, which
literally means "practice" and in relation to Islamic law means the
practices, sayings and deeds of Prophet Muhammad. The records of
Sunnah are contained in intricate detail in compilations known as
hadith.77 Within Islamic law, scholars use the hadith to resolve legal
questions that the Quran does not answer definitively. An important
difference is that while the Quran is divine and immutable, the hadith
fall into a variety of categories and corresponding levels of authority.
While it is true that while the importance of the Quran as a source
of Islamic law is accepted by almost all Muslims, many of the sources
of fundamental practice have derived from hadith. For example, the
Quran does not mention the number of times or method a Muslim
has to pray (salah), whereas the hadith expands on this. Similarly,
the Quran does not provide the rate of alms tax (zakah) that a Muslim
has to pay, whereas the hadith specifies this. Also, whilst the two
texts provide some legal rules, they are in no sense a fixed or complete
declaration of the law. On the basis of these two texts together then,
scholars have formulated the actual legal rules (sharia). In other
words, the law could be said to be a product of human interpretation
based on the word of God and the deeds of Prophet Muhammad.
This process of developing and extracting the law is called Ijtihad.
It should be mentioned at the outset that as with any historical
77. Hadith is a term that denotes a statement or action of the Prophet
Muhammad. Hadith are the second-most important source of Islamic law. There is
some dispute as to which hadith are authentic and therefore should be followed,
there are collections of hadith which are considered to be authentic by many sects.
e.g., the Sahih Muslim and Sahih Bukhari are considered wholly authentic by most
Sunni Muslims. See generally MUHAMMADD ZUBAYR SIDDIQI, THE HADITH FOR
BEGINNERS: AN INTRODUCTION TO MAJOR HADITH WORKS AND THEIR COMPLIERS (2006).
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revelation, neither the Quran nor the hadith could be said to cover
every future eventuality for the purposes of law-making. While
"during the life of the Prophet Muhammad, the Muslim community
was guided by rules laid down by the Prophet, after the death of the
Prophet, a void existed with regards to legal matters. Sunni Muslims
agreed upon that [the] interpretation of sharia was the preserve of
professional scholar-jurists (fuqaha) who were trained and licensed
in a guild-like system. Shiites too came to trust scholars trained in
their own guilds."78 Fuqaha in both sects accordingly interpreted
Islamic law after the death of the Prophet as and when necessary.79
Thus, in practice, many matters concerning war, spirituality
(ibaadat), or civil matters (muaamalat) -which were not explicitly
dealt with by the Quran or hadith, the Fuqaha developed further
methods to ensure the continuity of legal reasoning that would be
appropriate for contemporary political and social circumstances. The
two methods that were adopted for this purpose were reasoning by
analogical deduction (Qiyas) and consensus/agreement between
scholars (Ijma). A simple example of Qiyas from today, would be
reasoning whether betting in casinos is forbidden (haram) in Islamic
law -even though, casinos are not mentioned in either the hadith or
the Quran. The basis for ruling it as haram would be a combination
of the Quran and analogy. The Quran forbids both wine and games
of chance, understood to include gambling, in the same verse. Since
gambling through chance creates a danger of economic loss, by
analogy the same rationale is thought to apply to casino gaming and
therefore it is banned.
The other method, Jjma, is essentially a majority consensus of
Islamic scholars. The hadith of Prophet Muhammad stating "my
community will never agree upon an error"80 is cited in support of
Ijma. Whilst there are different views on whether Qiyas or Ijma are
superior to the other and there is often overlap, many Sunni scholars
78. See, e.g., DEVIN STEWART, ISLAMIC LEGAL ORTHODOXY: TWELVER SHIITE
RESPONSES TO THE SUNNI LEGAL SYSTEM 30 (1998).
79. See generally, BERNARD G. WEISS, THE SPIRIT OF ISLAMIC LAW 38- 87 (1998);
WAEL HALLAQ, A HISTORY OF ISLAMIC LEGAL THEORIES (1997); WAEL HALLAQ,
AUTHORITY CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN ISLAMIC LAW (2001).
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view Ijma as a third source of law and Qiyas as the fourth. Shia8l
scholars, in contrast to Sunni scholars, tend to rely more on 'Aql'
(intellect) i.e., independent reasoning more than Qiyas and Ijma. Shia
schools of thought also follow a different set of hadith, giving more
emphasis to the hadiths narrated by Prophet Muhammad's daughter,
Fatima and son-in-law Ali, who are part of the Ahl-ul-Bayat (the
family of Prophet Muhammad). Within the Shia and Sunni scholars
there are further sects and schools of law. Within Sunni (orthodox)
jurisprudence there are many schools of law (Madhabs), named after
the four early scholar-juridical authorities, Abu Hanifa, Malik, Shafii
and Ibn Hanbal. Whilst the rules within these schools are not
necessarily mutually exclusive, there is still great tolerance between
the schools when there is some disagreement as to specific details. In
fact, historically, scholars often disagreed about questions of God's
law. It was accepted that when two scholars disagreed and it was
impossible to say with certainty that was correct, Muslims could opt
to follow either scholar.82
This legal system- comprising sharia nd law-occupies a
primary place in Muslim thought. Indeed, some Muslims agree on
the comprehensiveness of Islamic law/sharia with regards to all
kinds of matters. In fact, sharia and "religion" are often understood
as synonymous for many Muslims. Islam is not simply religious
guidance for private life, but also a holistic tool of ascertaining what
the good society should look like. As such, it provides governing
principles about the conduct of public life, constitutionalism and
international relations. And, as stated above, the majority of Muslims
naturally identify Islamic law as a means to impose limits on arbitrary
governments and promote rights and a just political order based on
the rule of law. Mortimer states that "Islam, we are told, is not mere
religion: it is a way of life, a model of society, a culture, a
civilization."8 3
81. Shia and Sunni are the two major sects within Islam. Within these sects
are many sub-sects. The majority of Muslims are Sunni. The Shia supported Ali as
the rightful successor to Prophet Muhammad.
82. See Weiss, supra note 79 at 116-121.
83. MORTIMER EDWARD, FAITH AND POWER: THE POLITICS OF ISLAM 16 (1982).
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B. Islam on Constitutions
Within this system, sharia is the most important source of
guidance and therefore unsurprisingly occupies primary significance
with regards to matters of governance and politics. Sharia is expected
to contain "elements of an Islamic constitution as well as of a
constitutionalism to be defined in reference to it." 84 Al-Turabi argues
that shari'a does contain within it a detailed constitution. Similarly,
Maududi, an eminent scholar of Islam from the subcontinent, argued
that without sharia, Muslim society could not essentially be Islamic.
He argued that "if an Islamic society consciously resolves not to
accept the Sharia, and decides to enact its own constitution and laws
or borrow them from any other source in disregard of the Sharia, such
a society breaks its contract with God and forfeits its right to be called
'Islamic.' '85 This is, at a fundamental level, the theoretical conception
of Islamic Constitutionalism.
Historically, although contested, the primary basis of Islamic
constitutionalism can be traced back almost fourteen centuries earlier
to the experience of the first Muslim constitution, established by the
prophet Muhammad in Medina. In 622, the Prophet and his followers
migrated from Mecca, where religious intolerance and persecution
had become unbearable for the Muslim minority; 622 has become
known as the year of migration or the "hijrah." The year 622 also set
in motion two important Islamic events: the Islamic calendar
commenced and the first Islamic constitution- the Constitution of
Medina-was promulgated.86 It is "perhaps the earliest surviving
text of Islam that is accepted as authentic."87 In form and substance,
the document reads more like a peace pact or Charter between
different ethnic and religious groups -rather than a modern day
constitution that constitutes government or sets limits on it. This is
not surprising since the primary goal of the document was to end
bitter inter-tribal fighting between the two tribes of Aws and Khazraj
84. Raja Bahlul, Is Constitutionalism Compatible With Islam?, THE RULE OF LAW:
HISTORY THEORY AND CRITIcIsM 515,520 (P. Costa & D. Zolo eds., 2007).
85. ABL A'LA MAUDUDI, ISLAMIC LAW AND ITS INTRODUCTION (1955).
86. Ali Khan, The Constitution of Medina, available at http://works.bepress.com
/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1011&context=abukashif (last visited Aug. 11, 2014).
87. Paul Lawrence Rose, Muhammad, The Jews and the Constitution of Medina:
Retrieving the historical Kernel, 86 DER ISLAM, 1-29 (2011).
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within Medina.88 One commentator has suggested the principal
objective of the document was to establish political unity that would
be based on territory rather than, as was common in Arab society, on
tribes and kinship. Another writer comments that the Constitution of
Medina demonstrates that "the first Islamic state was founded not in
the shadow of swords, as is commonly believed in some circles, but
in the security of a social contract."89 The Constitution established
rights and obligations among the Ansar (Helpers) of Medina, the
Muhajirun (Emigres) who left Mecca with the Prophet, and the Jewish
tribes of Medina as they embarked upon a new journey of co-
existence and cooperation in the nascent Muslim polity founded in
Medina.90 Articles 1-23, of the constitution of Medina, addressed
mutual relations among Muslims. Articles 24-47 set out rules to
regulate inter-communal affairs between Muslims and non-Muslims,
the latter being identified as believers. It contained 63 articles and a
number of rights and responsibilities for those residing in Medina.
Based on its structure, it is likely that it was written as a series of
agreements rather than as one document. Part I included within its
ambit, Muslim, Jews and Christians and envisaged the establishment
of one pluralistic nation-or Ummah-formed by "believers and
non-believers" alike. It recognized diverse communities, which is
evident from the fact that it did not treat any group "as one
monolithic population; instead it recognized their diverse ethnic,
cultural, or linguistic characteristics, just as it acknowledges similar
diversity within the Muslim population."
The constitution provided that the migrants from Mecca and the
tribes from Medina were to "pay the bloodwit within their number
and shall redeem their prisoners with the kindness and justice
common."91 It provided that no one was to "leave anyone destitute
among them by not paying his redemption money or bloodwit in
88. See Khan, supra note 86.
89. Id. at 1.
90. Anvar Emon, Comment: Reflections on the ""C on stitu tion of Medina." An
Essay on Methodology and Ideology in Islamic Legal History, 1 UCLA J. ISLAMIC & NEAR
E. L. 103 (2002).
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kindness."92 Also "the God-fearing believers shall be against the
rebellious or him who seeks to spread injustice, or sin or animosity,
or corruption between believers; the hand of every man shall be
against him even if he be a son of one of them."93 Article 47 explicitly
stated that this Constitution "will not protect the unjust and the
sinner." Certain agreements were also crystallized by the
Constitution. Article 19, for example, provided that "the believers
must avenge the blood of one another shed in the way of God" and
Article 24 stated that "the Jews shall contribute to the cost of war so
long as they are fighting alongside the believers" and Article 44
declared that "contracting parties are bound to help one another
against any attack on [Medina] Yathrib." A model of freedom of
religion and non-interference in religious matters was also envisaged
in Article 25, which clarified that "the Jews have their religion and the
Muslims have theirs."
From the perspective of Islamic Constitutionalism, the
Constitution of Medina essentially framed the conceptual model for
future political leadership, or Caliphate, in the Islamic state.94 Some
Islamic scholars assert that the constitution of Medina is the first
constitution in the history of humanity. Hamidullah wrote that it was
the "earliest written constitution, promulgated by a sovereign for his
own [state] conduct, both in internal and foreign affairs."95 This
picture is probably not completely accurate as earlier constitutions
had been developed in Greece and Rome. Nevertheless, it can
certainly be considered as the root of Islamic Constitutionalism in that
it reflected the three cardinal principles (discussed later) of the
Islamic political system as theorized by Al-Mawdudi. Mawdudi, who
is widely considered as the pioneer of the idea of the "Islamic state"
and constitution that has flourished in past decades,96 coined and
92. Id. at art. 12.
93. Id. at art. 13.
94. R. B. Serjeant, The Sunnah Jdmi'ah, pacts with the Yathrib Jews, and the Tah rim
of Yathrib: Analysis and Translation of the Documents Comprised in the So-Called
'Constitution of Medina'. 41 BULLETIN OF THE SCHOOL OF ORIENTAL AND AFRICAN
STUDIES, 1, 41. (1978).
95. MUHAMMAD. HAMIDULLAH, THE FIRST WRITTEN CONSTITUTION IN THE
WORLD (KAZI PUBLICATION, INC. 1986).
96. SEYYED VALi REZA NASR, MAWDUDI AND THE MAKING OF ISLAMIC REVIVALISM
(1997).
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popularized the term "Islamic State" in his book, The Islamic Law
and Constitution, published in 1941 and subsequent writings.
According to his view, the Islamic state would follow Sharia, which
would comprehensively cover "family relationships, social and
economic affairs, administration, rights and duties of citizens, judicial
system, laws of war and peace and international relations. In short it
embraces all the various departments of life . . . The Sharia is a
complete scheme of life and an all-embracing social order where
nothing is superfluous and nothing lacking."97 He stated that the
Islamic State must be an "Islamic Democracy"98 and there would be
three cardinal principles underlying its operation: tawhid (unity of
God), risala (prophethood) and khilafa (caliphate or succession of the
prophet Muhammad).
Tawhid proposes that since God is the Creator, sovereignty is
vested only in the Divine and not the people. Maududi wrote that
the sovereignty of God and the sovereignty of the people are
mutually exclusive.99 According to him, "Islamic Democracy" was
the antithesis of secular Western democracy, since the latter
transferred sovereignty to the people. Naturally then, Islamic
constitutionalism differs significantly from western concept of
constitutionalism in that it entrusts sovereignty to God and not "we
the people" as is perceived to be the case in Western democracies.
Scholars have noted that this principle negates the concept of the legal
and political independence of human beings. In this system, Muslims
have to obey God, the Prophet, and those who have authority (ulu al-
amr) amongst them to the degree that their decisions and policies are
in accordance with God's commands in Qur'an and the Prophet's
tradition in hadith- or as we described earlier, sharia. To reconcile
this dichotomy between Islamic and Western notions of
constitutionalism, Rashid Al-Ghannouchi, a promising Islamic
intellectual, who also co-founded the Ennhada party in Tunisia
provides a reconciliatory explanation for "sovereignty of Allah" that
harmonizes with western concepts of constitutionalism. He argues
that since "there is no clergy in Islam, and Allah cannot be perceived
97. Mawdudi, Islamic Law at 57 (quoted in Adams at 113).
98. Abu al-A'la al-Mawdudi, Political Theory of Islam, in ISLAM: ITS MEANING
AND MESSAGE 159-61 (Khurshid Ahmad ed., 1976).
99. Id.
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directly, nor does He dwell in a human being or an institution which
can speak for Him. [Thus,] what the slogan "sovereignty belongs to
God" means is rule of law and government by the people."100
A second principle of Islamic constitutionalism is Risala. This
literally means "scriptures revealed from God through Prophets" or
Prophethood. The conceptual underpinning here is that Prophets
brings laws to their communities so as to guide them towards the
straight path of God. In the Islamic context of course, as discussed
earlier, such laws and rules are referred to as shari'a. As stated earlier
in this article, shari'a is based on two essential sources: the Quran and
the sunna. The Quran, the holy book of Islam, which contains God's
word revealed to the prophet Muhammad over a period of 23 years,
and the sunna- the practices and sayings of Muhammad contained
in the hadith-became the source of Islamic ethics and norms for
Muslim behavior. Since sovereignty is vested in God, while the ruler
must consult the existing legislature, its function "is really that of law-
finding, not of law-making."101 Another scholar has argued that, "the
Islamic constitution has only two important organs: the executive and
the judiciary. The third organ i.e., the legislature, is a less important
feature for the reason that almost all legislation has already been pre-
ordained by God and only remains to be implemented or executed by
the head of the state who, in consultation with the body of advisors
or otherwise, can make subordinate legislation by the way of
ordinances."102 Professor Abdullah An-Na'im, a prominent scholar,
disagrees with this view. He argues that human reasoning has
always played a fundamental role in "discovering" and
"determining" the will of God.
And certainly, Muslim jurists have for centuries specialized in
Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) and developed legal principles and
methodologies to interpret sharia. Therefore, many legal concepts of
Islam changed according to the time and place and the prevailing
circumstances, providing Islam with a sense of indeterminacy and
dynamism to suit different societies. An-Naim argues that, in
100. Raja Bahlul, Islamic Perspectives on Constitutionalism, (2005) available at
http://www.juragentium.org/topics/islam/law/en/bahlul.htm.
101. Mawdudi, supra note 97, at 77.
102. JAVID IQBAL, THE CONCEPT OF STATE IN ISLAM: A REASSESSMENT 13 (Iqbal
Academy Pakistan 2000).
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contrast to this historical reality of legal flux and change, the
dominant view of Islamic constitutionalism which assumes that since
Muslims accept the ultimate sovereignty of God, they must also
accept the decisions of men who speak for God, is conceptually
lacking.103  In contrast to those who advocate for "Islamic
Constitutionalism," he strongly believes that reformation within
Muslim societies is only possible if there is a secular state, and calls
for the separation of "historical sharia" (which is often perceived as
divine revelation) from the essential principles of Islam, as revealed
by the early tenure of Mohammed in Mecca.104 In his view, this
historical sharia is man-made and also likely violates the rights of
non-Muslims and women and is incompatible with concepts of the
nation-state, international law, and human rights.
Caliphate, or khilafa, is the third feature of Islamic
Constitutionalism. Caliphate is the idea of an Islamic state led by an
executive known as a caliph (meaning literally a successor, i.e., a
successor to Islamic prophet Muhammad). After Prophet
Muhammad's death, his closest aides, revered figures in Islam
thought, were elected to the position of Caliphate. After their death,
successive rulers from various Muslim dynasties claimed to be Caliph
of Islam-until the official abolishment of the post when Turkey
secularized under Kemal Ataturk. Today, while the concept of
caliphate is often used to describe Muslim empires of the past;
theoretically, it is a state, which encompasses the political unity of the
entire Muslim community globally, and ruled by a single caliph. The
conceptual basis of khilafa is based on the belief that since Muslims
are to be governed in accord with Islamic law, a leader is necessary to
implement this. However, since according to scholars of Islamic
Constitutionalism, God has already laid down the law, the head of
Islamic state (usually referred to as Khalifa or Imam) is only an
executive authority and has no inherent power to legislate.105 An-
103. ABDULLAH AN-NAI'M, TOWARD AN ISLAMIC REFORMATION: CIVIL LIBERTIES
HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, 81 (Syracuse University Press 1990).
104. ABDULLAH AN-NAI'M, ISLA AND THE SECULAR STATE: NEGOTIATING THE
FUTURE OF SHARI'A (2008).
105. KEMAL FARUK, THE EVOLUTION OF ISLAMIC CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY AND
PRACTICE FROM 610 TO 1926 (1971) (pointing out that caliph was either chosen by a
small group of Muslims or selected by the preceding caliph and was then confirmed
by the general Muslim public through a mass pledge of allegiance (by'a)).
[Vol. 38:1
The Islamic Constitutions Index
Na'im points out that this concept of khilafa is not necessarily
compatible with constitutionalism. There is no way of assessing the
continued political legitimacy of the executive once the initial
appointment and confirmation were made. Contrary to
impeachment procedures in modern constitutions, there were also no
means to remove the executive by withdrawing legitimacy. Thus
under this conventional model of Islamic Constitutionalism, the
nature and scope of powers of the executive are by no means limited.
This design problem did not exist at the beginning of Islam since the
Prophet was deemed to be chosen by God to lead the Islamic state, so
centralizing executive, judicial, and legislative powers in his person
was not problematic. However, after his demise and with the passage
of time, this paradox has made it difficult to restructure or set political
limits on the powers of the caliph that would parallel the limits set
within constitutional democracy.
III. Designing the Islamic Constitution
A. The Promise of Constitutional Islamization
Islam and - not Islam or - democracy tends to be the rallying call
of Muslim majorities in Muslim countries from Tunisia to Egypt and
Algeria to Pakistan. In a political landscape beset by
authoritarianism, they have promised both: constitutionalism and
Islam. Indeed, the rise of political Islam in the 1970s - or the
phenomenon commonly referred to as "Islamic fundamentalism" -
was in itself partly a reaction to the secularizing reforms of oppressive
Middle Eastern regimes.106 In societies where avenues for political
expression were forcibly blocked, movements based on Islamic
political philosophy represented the only opening left for protest. As
Fouad Ajami points out, "Islamist" movements have had significant
resonance in the Arab world precisely because, in contrast to
authoritarian, secular regimes, they were "democratic" and
representative; that is, "[they] invited men to participate . . . [in]
contrast to a political culture that reduces citizens to spectators and
106. ZUBAIDA, supra note 36, at 5 (arguing that political Islam is a reaction to
secularizing reforms by "Europe and Christianity"); Fareed Zakaria, Islam, Democracy
and Constitutional Liberalism, 119 POL. SCL Q. 1, 11-12 (2004) (describing how Arab
world associates failure of their governments with failure of secularism and the West
and how fundamentalism gave Arabs a language for dissent and opposition).
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asks them to leave things to their rulers. At a time when the future is
uncertain, it connects them to a tradition that reduces
bewilderment."107 As the idea of popular democracy laid its seed
after the Arab Spring, and Islamic parties came to power, in each
country, they promised a place for religion (namely Islam) in
statecraft and most importantly - the new constitution. Islamic-
oriented parties in the Arab Spring promised - directly or
indirectly-an Islamic constitution. Yet, what is an Islamic
constitution and how can we measure whether a constitution lives up
to the claim of being Islamic?
B. The Al-Azhar Islamic Constitution
As our analysis will show, there are myriad ways in which Islam
can be given a place in the constitutional order -some more central
than others. Islam can become a source of legislation or laws
repugnant o Islam can be declared void. It may require that the head
of state be a Muslim or the preamble may simply make a reference to
Islamic values. Even rights can be limited by reference to Islamic
principles.
Not only is the debate about Islamic constitutionalism and
democracy ongoing, but Muslim countries, since 1861 in Tunisia, are
still grappling with integrating and blending constitutionalism and
Islam. An Islamic constitution means different things to different
people -and this is even truer in the popular imagination. Yet, there
are countless opinions about what makes a society "Islamic." While
we know that all members of the OIC - an inter-governmental
organization which encapsulates the universe of Muslim majority
countries worldwide108 -have formal, written constitutions, in this
Article, we are particularly interested in how one defines an Islamic
constitution.109  This is most crucial since the prerequisite for
107. FOUAD AJAMI, THE ARAB PREDICAMENT: ARAB POLITICAL THOUGHT AND
PRACTICE SINCE 1967134 (1982).
108. Under the OIC Charter, Article 3(2), the criteria for membership are that
a country has a "Muslim majority" and that the Council of foreign ministers approves
the new member by consensus. The membership of countries with a Muslim
minority (e.g., Benin, Cameroon, Gabon, Guyana and Uganda) is therefore not in
accordance with the provisions on membership of the 0IC Charter. Nevertheless, all
OIC members are included in our sample for consistency.
109. The exception is Saudi Arabia, which does not have a formal, written
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achieving the goal of this article - comparing the Muslim world's
constitutions for their Islamicity, ranking them and assessing their
status on rights and democracy - is only possible if we have a
paradigm against which we can compare it to. And, for the purposes
of this analysis, there is one paradigmatic example: a model Islamic
constitution that the esteemed A1-Azhar University in Egypt has
drafted for governments in the Muslim world to emulate.
The context of the creation of the constitution is this: in October
1977, the Islamic Research Academy (IRA) at A1-Azhar University
hosted a major meeting in Cairo. A decision was taken there to draft
a model Islamic constitution that could be used as a framework by
any country that wished to model itself on the basis of Islamic
constitutionalism and sharia. All parties agreed that the content of
the Islamic Constitution drafted must not only be complaint of Sharia,
but it should especially be cognizant of differing Islamic schools of
jurisprudence. Soon thereafter, on Jan. 5, 1978, Grand Sheikh of Al-
Azhar issued a decree, whereby a High Committee of experts were
formed for the purpose of drafting this Islamic constitution. A year
later, the final version of this constitution was published in the
Autumn of 1978 in A1-Azhar's official magazine.10 However, "this
Islamic constitution was forgotten" for some time.111
Al-Azhar University, based in Cairo, is widely considered to be
constitution. In its case, the holy Quran is the highest law; however, we treat the three
1992 Royal Decrees establishing the basic system of government, provinces and the
consultative majlis (assembly) - the Basic Law-as the constitution.
110.Reinhard Schulze, Citizens of Islam. The Institutionalization of Muslim Legal
Debate., in LAW AND THE ISLAMIC WORLD PAST AND PRESENT 167-185 (Christopher Toll
& Jakob Skovgaard-Petersen eds., 1995) (narrating what has happened after the
Islamic constitution was introduced, "the [IRA]-proposal was not discussed openly.
The [IRA]-session of 1979 could not be held, as most participants from the duwal ar-
rafd, i.e., from those states, which rejected the Egyptian Israeli peace treaty of 1978,
were not allowed to travel to Cairo. Again, divergent political views prevented the
jurists from defining a legal conception of the Muslim nation (Umma). The main
problem, of course, was to what extent an Islamic constitution should be the legal
framework of the Umma; mostly it was postulated that an Islamic constitution should
be the model of nation-stateconstitutions. It should prescribe an Islamic form
ofgovernment and jurisdiction without questioning the sovereignty of the nation-
states").
111.Hamdi Dabash, Al-Azhar and Salafi Scholars Prepare Islamic Constitution,
EGYPT INDEPENDENT, (July 7, 2011), available at http://www.egyptindependent.com//
news/ al-azhar-and-salafi-scholars-prepare-islamic-constitution.
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one of the most authoritative institutional bodies on Islam globally.
It is the often considered the chief center of Arabic literature and
Islamic learning in the world. Founded over 1,100 years ago by the
Fatimid dynasty as a madrasa, or center of Islamic learning, it is one
of the oldest and most respected Sunni religious institutions in the
world. The head cleric of Al-Azhar, the Grand Imam of Al-Azhar,
also known as Grand Sheikh of Al-Azhar is considered by some
Muslims to be the highest authority in Sunni Islamic thought and
Islamic jurisprudence.112 And despite its subordination to the
Egyptian state in recent decades, it is still considered to be an
important learning center for Muslims. The madrasa was initially one
of the relics of the Isma'ili Shi'a Fatimid dynasty era of Egypt,
descended from Fatimah, daughter of Muhammad and Ali son-in-
law and cousin of Prophet Muhammad. By bringing together the
study of a number of different subjects in the same place it was one
of the first universities in the world -and the only one to survive as
a modem university. In 1961, Al-Azhar was officially established as
a "modern" university under the government of Egypt's second
President Gamal Abdel Nasser when a wide range of secular faculties
were added for the first time. Before then, the Encyclopedia of Islam
classifies the Al-Azhar as a madrasa, center of higher learning and,
since the 19th century, a religious university, but not as a university
in the secular academic sense, referring to its modern transition
process as a change "from madrasa to university." Even outside the
Muslim world, Al-Azhar is known to be a voice of moderate Islam.1 3
Returning to the Al-Azhar Islamic onstitution, a constitution
coming from an esteemed institution like Al-Azhar would naturally
be of some importance in the Muslim World. And so it was; after
being neglected for more than three decades, the Al-Azhar
constitution showed up at Cairo's Tahrir Square during the 2011
uprising.114 A scanned copy of the constitution, along with an English
112. CLINTON BENNETT, MUSLIMS AND MODERNITY: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
ISSUES AND DEBATES 220 (2005).
113. Al-Azhar Issues Bill of Rights for New Egypt, OnIslam (Jan. 11, 2012)
available at http:/ /www.onislam.net/english/news/global/455352-azhar-issues-
bill-of-rights-for-new-egypt.html.
114. This is not to say that the AI-Azhar Constitution was the sole or over-
arching model of constitutional text during discussions of constitution-making in
Egypt post-Arab Spring. Yet, it was an important and legitimate benchmark. Indeed,
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translation, was published on the July 13, 2011 in Tahrir Documents:
a website dedicated to archive, translate and electronically publish
activist papers from Cairo's Tahrir Square."5 Later, an Egyptian
newspaper, announced that Salafis (adherents of one of the most
puritanical strains of Islam), along with former Grand Mufti of Egypt,
Nasr Farid Wasel, and a group of renowned Islamic scholars, had
already started preparing a draft constitution for Egypt based on
sharia. Their coalition was called "Islamic Legitimate Body of Rights
and Reformation" (ILBRR) and essentially aimed to advance the
country towards an Islamic model of governance.116  More
importantly, Mohamed Yousry, ILBRR's secretary general and a
Salafi scholar, pointed out that the main model to frame the new
constitution was the Al-Azhar Constitution."7 Apparently, all the
Islamic movements in Egypt agreed upon this constitution as the
paradigmatic Islamic Constitution. One commentator even
suggested the A1-Azhar constitution could pacify disputes between
the various stakeholders as to what was Islamic or not."18
C. Analyzing "the" Islamic Constitution
The constitution itself consists of a preamble and nine sections,
encompassing 93 clauses in 9 sections. It sets out, inter alia, principles
related to how the economy will operate; it states that the judiciary
will be independent; provides for rights including the right to work,
freedom of opinion, religion and thought, freedom to join trade
unions and freedom of press. It provides for a presidency and the
means to appoint the president (Imam). Interestingly, in Article 81, it
also provides for the establishment of a "Supreme Constitutional
while the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt didn't de facto hold to this constitution,
Khairat el-shatter, an important figure in the Muslim Brotherhood was one of the
leaders of ILBRR and accordingly, it was always politically relevant. Further, during
that period, there were also discussions (in Arabic) by Islamic scholars during recent
uprisings that acknowledged the relevance of the Al-Azhar constitution to
constitution-making in Egypt. See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UJA I5HX
h7dE; see also https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=osXbrHz-psE.
115.See generally, Moamen Gouda, Islamic Constitutionalism and Rule of Law: A
Constitutional Economics Perspective, 24 CONST. POL. Eco. 57 (2013).
116. Id.
117. See, Dabash, supra note 111.
118. See, Gouda, supra note 115.
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Court... having the jurisdiction to decide upon the conformity of
laws and regulations to the rulings of Islamic shari'a and the
provisions of this Constitution." It also deals with other matters such
as constitutional amendments, holding the president accountable,
equality before the law and other administrative matters governing,
for example, where the capital city would be and issues concerning
the national flag. It also makes the president accountable to the
judiciary. Yet, its most apparent feature is the frequent referencing to
Islamic clauses.
Article 1 opens with a statement expressing the unity of the
Muslim political community globally. Article lb reads: "Islamic
shari'a is the source of all legislation." Article 65 states that "Judges
are subject only to the Islamic shari'a in their judgments." Article 61
also provides that "the judiciary shall rule justly in accordance with
the rule of Islamic shari'a." Further, Article 12 provides that "the state
is required to teach Muslims the fundamentals of religion, including:
religious obligations, the Prophet's biography, and biography of the
Caliphs. This study should be comprehensive throughout all years
of education." Article 18 provides that "the economy will be based
upon the principles of Islamic shari'a, which guarantees human
dignity and social justice." Accordingly usury is forbidden in Article
23. Even many of the rights are subject o sharia, for example, freedom
of religion and thought, the freedom to work, the freedom to express
opinion directly or indirectly, the freedom to establish trade union
associations and participate in them, personal freedom, and the
freedom of movement and congregation "are all basic and natural
rights that are protected within the framework of the Islamic shari'a,"
according to Article 29. In terms of the head of state, Article 47 makes
is clear that "candidates for the presidency must be: Muslim, male,
past the age of majority, of sound mind, pious, and knowledgeable
about the rules of Islamic shari'a." Importantly, Article 83 provides
"the state shall have a Shura council which, amongst other important
tasks, reviews whether "Legislation [is] not inconsistent with rulings
of Islamic shari'a."
Quite clearly, the Al-Azhar constitution is not short of Islamic
credentials - Islamic clauses are scattered on almost every page of the
constitution and it is clear that Islam and Islamic law is privileged
quite categorically as an overarching principle of the constitutional
and legal order. At the same time, the constitution is sparse on other
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important details, which is not surprising given its short length. For
example, it does not specify procedures for the impeachment of the
Imam, what the status of international law is. Nor does it say who is
eligible to become a member of parliament (presumably this is the
shura council, although even this is not clear), how ministers will be
appointed, whether there would be parliamentary or election
commissions, how the armed forces and police will be set-up and
regulated, the procedure for enacting legislation, or the method of
appointing judges and so forth.
Perhaps much of this has been deliberately left out by design
because the intention of the framers was to simply provide a template
"Islamic" constitution that could be molded by each state according
to its particular circumstances. Alternatively, perhaps there was
some recognition that going into specific details would be
problematic, not only because Islamic doctrine may not have had
much to say about a particular issue (e.g., the method of how judges
will be appointed or the procedure by which the Imam can be
impeached) but also because a greater level of detail was beyond the
capabilities of the drafters or that greater detail may results in more
divisiveness and harm the completion of the overall project without
adding much to the Islamic character of the constitution.119
Nevertheless, whatever the reason for drafting a less detailed
constitution, for our intents and purposes of assessing and comparing
Muslim countries' constitutions for their "Islamicity," the most
important parts of the constitution are those that specifically
reference and deal with Islam, and the constitution certainly provides
us with a template for doing so.
IV. Measuring Islamic Constitutions
A. Method
This section introduces an empirical analysis of Constitutional
Islamization. To comparatively and conclusively answer this
question, we need to first know the defining characteristics of
Islamization in constitutions.120 The Al-Azhar Constitution serves as
119. Rosalind Dixon & Tom Ginsburg, Deciding Not to Decide: Deferral in
Constitutional Design, 9 1. J. CoNsT. L. 636 (2011).
120. Our analysis is primarily text based; that is, we look at the design and
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the template for this exercise. We read, identified and then extracted
every "Islamic" clause from that constitution-that is, every clause
that makes some reference to Islam or has some Islamic
underpinning.121 Consequently, we identified 30 such "Islamic
clauses" and constructed a survey instrument codifying the clauses22
(Table 1 presents a list of the 30 questions/clauses that we found to
represent the universe of Constitutional Islamization and the
corresponding articles in Al-Azhar constitution). These were clauses
that had an explicit focus of injecting the constitution with an Islamic
feature. Our next step was to use these Islamic clauses as a basis for
comparison among the constitution of Islamic countries. In order to
define our sampling pool of Islamic countries and in the interests of
capturing every country that was Muslim majority or at least
contained a sizeable Muslim population (such as Cameroon and
Benin), we focused on constitutions from countries that are members
of the Organisation of Islamic Co-operation (OIC). The OIC, founded
in 1970, is the second largest inter-governmental organization after
text of the "big-C" Constitution -the written document, rather than the broader
constitutional order in the country in terms of defining "constitution". In doing so,
our work follows a tradition of text-based analysis in the constitutional design
literature. E.g., see, Tom Ginsburg, Daniel Lansberg-Rodriguez & Mila Versteeg,
Mhen to Overthrow Your Government: The Right to Resist in the World's Constitutions, 60
UCLA L. REV. 1184 (2013); David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, Sham Constitutions, 101
CALIF. L. REV. 863 (2013); Zachary Elkins Et Al., The Endurance of National
Constitutions 82 (2009).
121. This is not to say that clauses not included as "Islamic" in our
methodology cannot be justified as "Islamic doctrine". For example, Article 16 states
that "public sovereignty is based on the interest of the citizens, in particular
protecting religion, mind, soul, property, and honor" and Article 33 prohibits torture.
Certainly, support for principles underlying these clauses can be found in Islamic
teachings about human rights and governance; however, the focus of this study is on
identifying and conceptualizing explicit constitutional privileging of Islam in
constitutions for the purposes of concrete measurement and so we exclude clauses
that could only indirectly be justified as originating from Islamic theology.
122. We found that while the Al-Azhar constitution captured an
overwhelming number of the Islamic clauses found today, there were some
important ones that were contained in the constitutions of several Muslim countries,
yet were lacking in the A1-Azhar constitution; for example, the Al-Azhar constitution
did not contain clauses declaring Islam as a state religion. The references had to be
explicitly "Islamic" to be counted in our survey instrument; this ensured rigour. That
is, references to God or religion in general did not classify as Islamic within our
instrument. So for example, the Indonesian Constitution references God, but since it
is not a specifically Islamic reference, we do not count this as an Islamic clause.
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the United Nations and has membership of "57 states spread over
four continents." It includes virtually every Muslim majority country
as a member and is "the collective voice of the Muslim world and
ensuring to safeguard and protect the interests of the Muslim world
in the spirit of promoting international peace and harmony among
various people of the world." 123
To collect the constitutions of these countries for coding, we
drew on constitutional texts from Constitute, an effort by Google and
the Comparative Constitutions Project to catalogue the formal
contents of the written and in-force constitutions in the World. We
read and analyzed the current constitution of each of the 56 OIC
members (we excluded Palestine from the analysis to avoid potential
discussions about what constituted a "constitution" for our purposes
and so forth). For the countries located in the Middle East, we even
read the Arabic language versions of the constitutions so as to ensure
that all nuances regarding Islamicity were captured. Using the 30
Islamic clauses as a benchmark, the OIC-member constitutions were
then coded by two separate coders, rechecked by the other coder and
eventually comprised our unique dataset of Islamic constitutions.
The appendix contains the methodology that was used to build our
Islamic Constitutionalism Index.124
Table 1: Islamic Articles in the Al-Azhar Constitution
Question Corresponding articles in Al-
Azhar Constitution
A. General Characteristics
Q1. [STATEREL]- Does the constitution state Article lb
that Islam is the state religion?
123. Organisation of Islamic Co-operation website, available at http://
www.oic-oci.org/oicv2/home/?lan=en.
124. To be clear, the index is a snapshot of constitutions in force as of 2014 and
does not trace the incidence or occurrence of Islamicity in constitutions historically.
Further, we make no claims about the relationship between the de facto level of
Islamicity in a constitution and de jure Islamicity of that state in practice.
2015]
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
Q2. [PREAMBLE]- Does the Preamble reference Preamble
Islamic idiom?
Q3. [UNITY]- Is there reference to the unity of Article 1-3
OR association with the Muslim world or any
mention of Ummah (Islamic political
community)?
Q4. [JIHAD]- Is there a reference to jihad or Article 56
defense of the faith?
Q5. [CALENDAR]- Does the constitution Article 15
reference an Islamic calendar and/or holidays?
Q6. [HDMUSLIM]- Does the head of state or Article 47
government have to be Muslim?
Q7. [CTZMUSLIM]- Should all citizens be No mention of non-Muslims in
Muslims? AI-Azhar constitution
Q8. [JDMUSLIM]- Is it stated that judges of the Articles 61 & 65
highest court need to be Muslim?
Q9. [OATH]- Does it mention Islamic idiom in Article 48
the presidential and/or ministerial or
parliamentary Oath?
Q10. [MORAL]- Are Islamic morals given some Article 7
constitutional foundation?
Ql. [AMENDMENT]- Are the provisions Preamble, Article lb
related to Islam unamendable?
Q12. [ADVISORY]- Does the constitution Article 83
mention a religious council that is advisory?
Q13. [AUTHORITY]- Does the source of Articles 55 & 56 & 57
authority or power stem from any religious
notions?
Q14. [ACCOUNTABILITY]- Is government Article 7
accountable to or to rule in accordance with the
laws and limits of Islam?
B. Rights
Q15. [RIGHTS1]- Does the constitution make Article 29
the enjoyment of any rights or freedoms subject
to sharia requirements?
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Q16. [WOMEN]- Is there a clause stating that Article 8
women should serve their husband or that
serving the family is their priority?
C. Executive
Q17. [DUTY]- Does the head or Article 47
state/ government have some religious
duties/ symbolism?
Q18. [HDKNOWLEDGE]- Does the head of Article 47
state or government need to possess Islamic
knowledge?
Q19. [PLEDGE]- Is the head of Article 48
state/ government appointed through pledge
of allegiance (bai'ah)?
D. Legislation
Q20. [SOURCE]- Is Islam identified as a source Article lb
of legislation?
Q21. [SUPERMACY] What is its degree of Article lb
supremacy of Islam? Code the intensity (Asked
only if SOURCE is answered 1)
Q22. [REPUGNANCE]- Does the constitution Articles 83 & 92
state that no laws can be repugnant to Islam?
E. Judiciary
Q23. [JUDICIARY]- Is there an explicit Article 81
provision requiring the judiciary to apply
Sharia or refuse to apply laws that contradict it?
Q24. [JDKNOWLEDGE]- Is it stated that judges Article 65
of the highest court need to have Islamic
knowledge?
Q25. [COMPLIANCE]- Does the constitution Article 83
mention a religious council or judicial court
that has the power to review legislation (ex ante
or ex post) to declare sharia compliance?
F. Economy
Q26. [ECONOMY] - Does it provide that the Article 23
economy/trade or banking will be in
accordance with Islam?
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Q27. [INTEREST]- Does the constitution ban Article 23
interest rate (riba)? (Asked only if ECONOMY
is answered 1)
Q28. [ALMS]- Does it make provision for the Article 26
state to recognize or organize alms/ charity/
Zakat/Waqf?
G. Other Issues
Q29. [CRIME]- Does the constitution make any Articles 56 & 59 & 69 & 71 & 72
explicit provision that Islamic criminal & 79
penalties (amputations, stoning) will be
implemented?
Q30. [EDUCATION]- Does the constitution Articles 10 & 11
make provision for the state to provide Islamic
(or religious) education?
B. Empirical Findings on Islamic Clauses
Analysis of the data shows that Constitutional Islamization is
highly prevalent in the constitutions of many Muslim majority
countries. However, a small number of Muslim majority countries
describe themselves as secular-most notably the Central Asian
countries and Turkey but also Mali - and, as expected, we do not find
Islamic clauses in the constitutions of countries that are not Muslim
majority (i.e., do not contain a population of greater than 50%
Muslims). Some, such as that of Uzbekistan and Sierra Leone are
completely silent on the treatment of religion in the state-that is,
they do not declare Islam or secularism as a constitutional principle.
Conversely, over half (27), or almost 60%, of the 45 Muslim majority
countries in the world express some relationship to Islam in their
constitution;125 that is, they have undergone some degree of
125. Pew lists 49 Muslim majority countries, Pew Religious and Public Life
Project (Jan. 27, 2011) available at http://features.pewforum.org/muslim-
population/. We have not included in our sample four countries-Kosovo, Mayotte,
Palestine and Western Sahara; hence our sample of Muslim majority countries is 45
and not 49. Kosovo is not a U.N. member or non-member state. None of these four
states are recognized. In any case, the constitution of Kosovo does not contain any
Islamic clause. The provisional constitutions of Palestine and Western Sahara do
contain some. Mayotte does not have an independent constitution. Hence, even if
we included these countries the results would even out.
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Constitutional Islamization. This is an important finding: Islam plays
a major part in most Muslim countries' constitutions. Nevertheless,
there is tremendous variation in the degree and mode to which these
constitutions are Islamized.
One popular clause is the state religion clause that declares Islam
to be the state religion -a staggering 23 of the 25 constitutions in the
world that refer to Islam contain these clauses. Clauses that state that
Islam will be a source of law are also popular; 18 constitutions have
such a clause. 6 constitutions contain repugnancy clauses (sometimes
in addition to a source of law clause e.g. in the case of Iraq), which
state that no laws can be passed that contradict Islam or sharia or
some similar variant. In Iran, the constitution even states that judges
should refrain from executing laws that violate Islam; similarly in
Saudi Arabia, "the judges bow to no authority other than that of
Islamic Shari'ah," Article 46. Other popular clauses are those that
require that the head of state or government be Muslim (15
constitutions contain such a requirement). A number of constitutions
provide for Islamic language in the oath; while the constitution of
Pakistan even requires members of parliament to be those "who do
not violate Islamic injunctions (Article 62)." Some, including that of
Iran and Yemen, provide that the head of government (in addition to
head of state) should be Muslim. Other constitutions - that of
Pakistan, Mauritania, Morocco, Egypt and Algeria -provide for an
advisory religious body. In Iran, however, the body is not simply
advisory but has significant powers; including that of reviewing
legislation to assess whether laws violate Islamic principles. The
Pakistani Constitution also provides for a Federal Shariah Court that
can "examine and decide the question whether or not any law or
provision of law is repugnant o the injunctions of Islam, as laid down
in the Holy Quran and Sunnah of the Holy Prophet" in Article 203 C.
In terms of rights, while the Afghan and Bahraini constitutions
limit some constitutional rights as to what is permitted under Islam,
in Iran, Saudi Araba and Maldives, all rights are subject to Islam.
Some constitutions include recognition of Islamic holidays (e.g. Saudi
Arabia); while others make provisions related to Islam unamendable
(e.g. Afghanistan). Interestingly, in terms of analogizing Islam and
Sharia as a "natural law" limit on earthly authority of rulers, as was
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perceived to be the case in pre-modern times, only the Saudi
constitution explicitly provides that the king "shall undertake to rule
according to the rulings of Islam" in Article 25. In Maldives,
however, the President can be removed if he is in "direct violation of
a tenet of Islam" - Article 100. There are more clauses that we found,
for example, related to jihad, the provision of charity and the
provision of religion education -but these were rare. Another rare,
yet powerful and interesting clause was found in Maldives- under
9(d) of that country's constitution, one cannot be a citizen unless he
or she is a Muslim. For an extensive and universal examination of
which constitutions include any of the 30 Islamicity clauses we
capture, please see the appendix.
C. Islamic Constitutions Index-Ranking Islamic Constitutions
The survey of clauses provides us with a comparative empirical
assessment of the world of Islamic constitutions. It allows us to see
which clauses are most popular-for example, state religion, and
head of state being Muslim and source of law clauses. Yet without
further nalysis, surveying Islamicity does not in itself provide
answers to more interesting questions; which is the most Islamic
constitution in the world and which is the least? Is it true that Iran's
constitution is the most Islamic, is it true that Pakistan or Afghanistan
are constitutional theocracies or that Turkey is secular? Accordingly,
using our unique dataset, we created something novel: the Islamic
Constitutions Index (ICI) that ranks all the OIC members'
constitutions for their Islamicity. Our index measures Islamic
constitutionalism. It distinguishes between OIC members that have
Islamic constitutions and those that do not.
Each country's score on the index is the total number of Islamic
clauses in its constitution. The score of each of the investigated
Islamic feature is one. An exception would be the Islamic feature
related to the degree of supremacy of Islam in the constitution. For
this specific article, we developed a special scoring methodology. If
the supremacy article refers to Islam/ Islamic law/ sharia, 2 points are
added. 1 point is scored if the article refers to "principles" of
Islam/Islamic law/sharia. The reason behind this is that a direct
reference to Islam or sharia would be valued more than a reference to
"principles," which might refer to general principles in Islam like
justice, equality, and modesty. In addition, an extra point is added if
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the supremacy article states that Islam (or its principles) is "a" source
of law or if there is no other law governing a matter then Islamic law
can come in. 2 points are added if religion (Islam in our case) is "a"
primary or basic or foundational source of law. Finally, 3 points if the
supremacy article states that Islam (or its principles) is "the" source
(or the only source).
The reason behind this scoring theme is that we perceive
"supremacy" clauses that state that laws must comply with Islam or
that privilege Islam as an important source of legislation are most
powerful in terms of Islamicity, more so than any other clause -even
state religion clauses.126 This is because these supremacy clauses may
allow courts to undertake an "Islamic judicial review," as Professor
Feldman labels it, the purpose of which will be "not merely to ensure
[legislation's] compliance with the constitution but rather, to
guarantee that it does not violate Islamic laws or values" and thus be
fully consistent with it.127 That is, both types of clauses, imply the
supremacy - or at the very least - create a privileged space for Islam
and Islamic law within the normative constitutional-legal order.28 To
be sure, while formulating a supremacy clause in the form of a
repugnancy clause would arguably imply a more robust ability to
challenge legislation on the basis of violation of a "superior"
normative order grounded in Islam, the source of law clause,
depending on the degree to which it entrenches Islam, as "a" or "the"
source, could also potentially serve this function.129 Indeed, as
Professors Brown and Sherif opine, even simply privileging Islam as
"a" source of law - the weakest formulation of a supremacy clauses -
in the constitution means that it becomes possible for many to argue
that Islam authoritatively forms the "fundamental legal
framework."130 For more details on our scoring methodology, please
126. See Ahmed and Ginsburg, supra note 29.
127. See FELDMAN, FALL AND RISE, supra note 24, at 2 (discussing increasing
tendency for governments in majority-Muslim countries to declare themselves
Islamic and apply Sharia).
128. See Nathan J. Brown & Abel Omar Sherif, Inscribing the Islamic Shari'a in
Arab Constitutional Law, in ISLAMIC LAW AND THE CHALLENGES OF MODERNITY 55, 63
(Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad & Barbara Freyer Stowasser eds., 2004) (citing examples
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see methodology section in the appendix.
Using our resulted scores, we then rank all countries according
to their Islamicity. The more a constitution promises with respect to
Islam, the more Islamic it is and the higher it's score and accordingly,
it's ranking. Thus, a score of zero indicates that the country in
question has not undergone any degree of Constitutional
Islamization while scores above zero illustrate Islamization- the
higher the number, the greater the Islamic credentials of that
country's constitution. Table 2 demonstrates the ranking of the
constitutions of OIC countries according to the degree of Islamicity.
Table 2: Ranking Islamic Constitutions Index
Rank Countries Sum
1 Iran 1979 (rev. 1989) 26
2 Saudi Arabia 1992 (rev. 2005) 23
3 Maldives 2008 17
4 Pakistan 1973 (reinst. 2002, rev. 2012) 16
5 Somalia 2012 14
6 Afghanistan 2004 13
7 Yemen 1991 (rev. 2001) 13
8 Bahrain 2002 11
9 Iraq 2005 11
10 Algeria 1963 (rev. 2008) 9
11 Mauritania 1991 (rev. 2012) 9
12 Sudan 2005 9
13 Egypt (2013) 8
14 Libya 2011 8
15 Oman 1996 (rev. 2011) 8
16 Qatar 2003 8
17 Kuwait 1962 (reinst. 1992) 7
18 Morocco 2011 7
19 United Arab Emirates 1971 (rev. 2004) 7
20 Comoros 2001 (rev. 2009) 6
21 Brunei 1959 (rev. 1984) 5
22 Malaysia 1957 (rev. 1996) 5
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23 Syria 2012 5
24 Tunisia 2014 (Draft Translation) 5
25 Jordan 1952 (rev. 2011) 4
26 Bangladesh 1972 (reinst. 1986, rev. 2011)* 2
27 Djibouti 1992 (rev. 2010) 1
28 Albania 1998 (rev. 2008) 0
29 Azerbaijan 1995 (rev. 2009)* 0
30 Benin 1990* 0
31 Burkina Faso 1991 (rev. 2012)* 0
32 Cameroon 1972 (rev. 2008)* 0
33 Chad 1996 (rev. 2005)* 0
34 Cote D'Ivoire 2000* 0
35 Gabon 1991 (rev. 1997)* 0
36 Gambia 1996 (rev. 2004)* 0
37 Guinea 2010* 0
38 Guinea-Bissau 1984 (rev. 1991)* 0
39 Guyana 1980 (rev. 1995)* 0
40 Indonesia 1945 (reinst. 1959, rev. 2002) 0
41 Kazakhstan 1995 (rev. 1998)* 0
42 Kyrgyz Republic 2010* 0
43 Lebanon 1926 (rev. 2004) 0
44 Mali 1992* 0
45 Mozambique 2004 (rev. 2007)* 0
46 Niger 2010* 0
47 Nigeria 1999* 0
48 Senegal 2001 (rev. 2009)* 0
49 Sierra Leone 1991 (reinst. 1996, rev. 2008) 0
50 Surinam 1987 (rev. 1992) 0
51 Tajikistan 1994 (rev. 2003)* 0
52 Togo 1992 (rev. 2007)* 0
53 Turkey 1982 (rev. 2002)* 0
54 Turkmenistan 2008* 0
55 Uganda 1995 (rev. 2005)* 0
56 Uzbekistan 1992* 0
The rankings illuminate the world of Constitutional Islamization
for us. In some senses, they confirm popular assumptions, Saudi
Arabia and Iran are top of the rankings; however some may be
surprised to find Somalia and Maldives -not associated in the
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popular imagination with official Islam-are not lagging far behind
these countries. The results for Turkey and the Central Asian
countries are not surprising; these countries have expressed
commitments to secularism in their constitution and some regimes in
these countries have even at times suppressed the free exercise of
Islam.131
What the index does that is most useful is that it allows us to
distinguish between various degrees and layers of Constitutional
Islamization. That is, it illustrates that "Constitutional Islamization"
is not a monolithic phenomenon; its occurrence varies immensely.
Some countries have much more Islamic constitutions than others
and some Islamic clauses matter much more than others in terms of
their potential effects in the country's normative constitutional order.
So, although the Saudi Constitution makes many references to Islam,
it is really the Iranian Constitution which is much more "Islamic" in
substance. Our analysis and index thus adds much more nuance and
sophistication to our understanding of the world of Islamic
constitutions. Most importantly, it allows us to test various questions
that provide novel insights into the question of Islam, democracy and
rights; questions that remain untested empirically to date.
D. Bivariate Correlations
1. Population, Geography and Colonialism
The index above illustrates that countries that do not have a
Muslim majority see no Constitutional Islamization in their
constitutions. On the other hand, 60% of countries with a Muslim
majority see some Constitutional Islamization. Yet, there are also
countries with large Muslim majorities that have no degree of
Constitutional Islamization in their constitution. Indeed 18 Muslim
majority countries including Azerbaijan, Mali and the Kyrgyz
Republic, either explicitly demarcate state and religion in their
constitution, or make no mention of Islam. Countries which have the
most Islamic constitutions -including Iran, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan,
Maldives also have a population that is religiously homogenous to a
131."" denotes all Muslim majority countries that have explicitly declared
secularism as a constitutional principle. Bangladesh is quite interesting; it adopts
secularism as a constitutional principle but also makes Islam the state religion.
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very high degree; that is, over 90% Muslim. That means while
countries where Muslims are not a majority will almost certainly not
see Islamic clauses, conversely and perhaps unsurprisingly, in
general, the higher the percentage of Muslims in the country'
population, the more likely it appears that a country will have Islam
in its constitution. That is, the number of Muslims, while not
necessarily co-related directly with the level of Islamicity in a
constitution, nevertheless increases the probability of Constitutional
Islamization. Interestingly, we also find that the Central Asian
countries in which poll results, in contrast to the majority of Muslim
states, show that there is low demand for Sharia to be the official law
of the land, there is zero Constitutional Islamization.32 On the other
hand, in the Middle East and North Africa, where polls show a high
demand for Islamic law to be applied, there are also relatively high
degrees of Constitutional Islamization. This illustrates that
democratic demand perhaps does partly influence the degree of
adoption of Islamic clauses in the constitution. See below for a side-
by-side comparison of Islamicity vs. Muslim population; we have
excluded countries that have zero Islamicity in their constitution.
Figure 1. Levels of Islamicity vs Muslim Population %
132. Pew Research Center's Religion & Public Life Project, Beliefs About Sharia,
(Apr. 30 2013) available at http://www.pewforum.org/2013/04/30/the-worlds-
muslims-religion-politics-society-beliefs-about-sharia/.
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Taking geography into consideration, there seems to be
significant differences of Islamicity according to various geographic
regions. The Central Asian countries and European Muslim majority
states (Albania) have zero Constitutional Islamization. In South-East
Asia, Malaysia's constitution is Islamized to some degree, so is that
of Brunei, but Indonesia's is not (although Indonesia's constitution
does make references to "God"). In South Asia, the constitution of
every Muslim country- Bangladesh, Pakistan, Maldives and
Afghanistan- is Islamized. In the Middle East and North Africa, the
constitution of every Muslim country, with the exception of Lebanon,
is Islamized. Africa presents some mixed results: some Muslim
countries - e.g., Sierra Leone - are silent on the issue of Islam in the
constitution. Others such as Mali and Senegal expressly declare a
commitment to secularism while states including Somalia and
Djibouti have undergone Constitutional Islamization. Further, the
constitutions of Muslim countries in South Asia and the Middle East
& North Africa not only have a very high probability of being
Islamized but they also register the highest levels of Islamicity. It can
be seen that some countries have much more Islamic constitutions
than others based on where they are located. Perhaps this is due to a
number of factors including colonial history, distance from the
epicenter of Islam -Mecca/ Medina in Saudi Arabia, the means by
which Islam spread, who the agents of religious spread were (i.e.,
military vs traders) and so forth. See a geographical illustration of
Constitutional Islamization below and notice the absence of Central
Asian and many African countries that have a Muslim majority.
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Figure 2. Levels of Islamicity vs Region of the World
Another interesting observation is the relation between
colonialism and Constitutional Islamization. The two states that have
the most Islamic constitutions were never colonized. In general
though, countries that were colonized by the British see relatively
higher degrees of Islamization than countries that were colonized by
other colonial powers -particularly the French. Indeed, no country
in the French colonial tradition has adopted the repugnancy clause
that makes all laws repugnant to Islam void. It can be argued that
colonial structures have enduring legacies on legal systems, long after
the colonial power has packed up and moved home.133
133. Daniel M. Klerman et al., Legal Origin or Colonial History, 3 J. LEGAL
ANALYSIS 379, 380 (2011).
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Figure 3. Constitutional Islamization and Colonization
2. Islamicity and Human Rights
We now come to a question that has often been asked in the
popular imagination; what about Constitutional Islam and human
rights? Is the constitutionalization of Islam incompatible with the
provision of constitutional rights? Western constitutionalist thought
has generally tended to view the Islamic world as the "antithesis of
constitutional government."134  Scholars including Samuel
Huntington claimed that not only is "Islam" a violent religion, but
that "Islamic civilization" was destined to "clash" with "Western
civilization" in the name of authoritarian politics.135 This narrative
has penetrated not only academic but also policy thinking in the
134. See BROWN, supra note 29, at 107 (discussing the perceived incompatibility
of Islamic world and constitutionalism by Western scholars such as Montesquieu).
135. Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations, 72 FOREIGN AFF. 22, 22-49
(1993) (explaining hypothesis that civilizations based on concrete cultural differences
will at the center of global political clashes); SAMUEL HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF
CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING OF THE MODERN WORLD ORDER 14 (1996) (predicting
that civilizations based on concrete cultural differences will at the center of global
political clashes).
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United States and Europe. The House of Lords in the United
Kingdom recently stated that Sharia was "wholly incompatible" with
human rights legislation.36 A number of U.S. states have also
attempted to enact laws that forbid state courts from considering
Islamic law when deciding cases.37 Similarly, during the drafting of
the Iraqi Constitution, there was much discomfort within
Washington about the possible inclusion of Islamic law in the Iraqi
Constitution.138 "Implicit in these concerns is an assumption that an
"Islamic" state, even if democratically established, would be
transformed into an illiberal and undemocratic "theocracy."139
Using data of the Comparative Constitutions Project, we
investigate the relation between Islamicity of a constitution and the
number of constitutional rights below (Table 3).
Table 3. Islamicity of Constitution in Muslim Majority Countries
and Rights
Countries ICI Rights
Iran 1979 (rev. 1989) 26 44
Saudi Arabia 1992 (rev. 2005) 23 13
Maldives 2008 17 72
Pakistan 1973 (reinst. 2002, rev. 2012) 16 43
Somalia 2012 14 N/A
Afghanistan 2004 13 36
136. Afua Hirsch, Sharia Law Incompatible with Human Rights Legislation,
GUARDIAN (Oct. 23, 2008, 11:29 AM), available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/
world/2008/oct/23/religion-islam.
137. Oklahoma Sharia Law Blocked by Federal Judge, HUFFINGTON POST (May 25,
2011, 7:10 PM), at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/11/08/oklahoma-sharia-
law-struck-down-n780632.html (discussing legal debate around Oklahoma's
attempt at banning state courts from considering Islamic law when deciding cases);
see Zaid Jilani, At Least 13 States Have Introduced Bills Guarding Against Non-Existent
Threat of Sharia Law, THINK PROGRESS (Feb. 8, 2011), http://thinkprogress.org
/politics/ 2011/02/08/142590/sharia-states/?mobile=nc (13 U.S. States have
introduced bills to circumvent the application of sharia).
138. L. PAUL BREMER III, MY YEAR IN IRAQ 224 (2006) (discussing Iraqi
constitutional process and role of Grand Ayatollah Sistani).
139. John 0. Voll, Islam and Democracy: Is Modernization a Barrier, 1 RELIGION
COMPASS 170, 171 (2007).
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Yemen 1991 (rev. 2001) 13 132
Bahrain 2002 11 43
Iraq 2005 11 51
Algeria 1963 (rev. 2008) 9 36
Mauritania 1991 (rev. 2012) 9 30
Sudan 2005 9 48
Egypt (2013) 8 N/A
Libya 2011 8 35
Oman 1996 (rev. 2011) 8 39
Qatar 2003 8 32
Kuwait 1962 (reinst. 1992) 7 N/A
Morocco 2011 7 51
United Arab Emirates 1971 (rev. 2004) 7 30
Comoros 2001 (rev. 2009) 6 23
Brunei 1959 (rev. 1984) 5 2
Malaysia 1957 (rev. 1996) 5 30
Syria 2012 5 41
Tunisia 2014 (Draft Translation) 5 N/A
Jordan 1952 (rev. 2011) 4 28
Bangladesh 1972 (reinst. 1986, rev. 2011)* 2 47
Djibouti 1992 (rev. 2010) 1 25
Albania 1998 (rev. 2008) 0 75
Azerbaijan 1995 (rev. 2009)* 0 70
Benin 1990* 0 42
Burkina Faso 1991 (rev. 2012) 0 52
Cameroon 1972 (rev. 2008)* 0 32
Chad 1996 (rev. 2005) 0 44
Cote D'Ivoire 2000* 0 35
Gabon 1991 (rev. 1997)* 0 33
Gambia 1996 (rev. 2004) 0 61
Guinea 2010 0 43
Guinea-Bissau 1984 (rev. 1991)* 0 46
Guyana 1980 (rev. 1995)* 0 55
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Indonesia 1945 (reinst. 1959, rev. 2002) 0 31
Kazakhstan 1995 (rev. 1998) 0 56
Kyrgyz Republic 2010 0 68
Lebanon 1926 (rev. 2004) 0 13
Mali 1992 0 42
Mozambique 2004 (rev. 2007)* 0 63
Niger 2010 0 46
Nigeria 1999* 0 55
Senegal 2001 (rev. 2009) 0 31
Sierra Leone 1991 (reinst. 1996, rev. 2008) 0 55
Surinam 1987 (rev. 1992) 0 46
Tajikistan 1994 (rev. 2003) 0 64
Togo 1992 (rev. 2007)* 0 48
Turkey 1982 (rev. 2002) 0 66
Turkmenistan 2008 0 54
Uganda 1995 (rev. 2005)* 0 69
Uzbekistan 1992 0 53
In general, there seems to be no direct co-relation between the
number of rights in a constitution and its degree of Islamicity;140 in fact,
it seems that some constitutions with a high degree of Islamicity
contain a higher number of rights than less Islamic constitutions. For
example, Maldives has a very Islamic constitution, yet it also has the
second highest number of rights (out of 45 Muslims countries) and
more than many Muslim countries that have less Islamic
constitutions. Nevertheless, constitutions of Muslim majority
countries that have zero levels of Islamicity seem to, on average,
contain a higher number of rights than constitutions of Muslim
countries that have some level of Islamicity.
140. We acknowledge that focusing on de jure number of rights promised in
a constitution rather than assessing de facto rights within a particular country may
not reflect the reality of human rights within a state. Yet, we believe the
constitutional text (and its promise of rights and limits on government) is a
foundational tool through which citizens and civil society can mobilize to realize
human rights.
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To demonstrate, below we include a ranking of Muslim countries
based on the number of rights in their constitution, a * next to a
country denotes an explicit commitment to secularism in the
constitution.
Table 4. Muslim Countries Ranked by Number of Rights
Rank Countries Rights ICI
1 Somalia 2012 N/A 14
2 Egypt (2013) N/A 8
3 Kuwait 1962 (reinst. 1992) N/A 7
4 Tunisia 2014 (Draft Translation) N/A 5
5 Albania 1998 (rev. 2008) 75 0
6 Maldives 2008 72 17
7 Azerbaijan 1995 (rev. 2009)* 70 0
8 Uganda 1995 (rev. 2005)* 69 0
9 Kyrgyz Republic 2010 68 0
10 Turkey 1982 (rev. 2002) 66 0
11 Tajikistan 1994 (rev. 2003) 64 0
12 Mozambique 2004 (rev. 2007)* 63 0
13 Gambia 1996 (rev. 2004) 61 0
14 Kazakhstan 1995 (rev. 1998) 56 0
15 Guyana 1980 (rev. 1995)* 55 0
16 Nigeria 1999* 55 0
17 Sierra Leone 1991 (reinst. 1996, rev. 2008) 55 0
18 Turkmenistan 2008 54 0
19 Uzbekistan 1992 53 0
20 Burkina Faso 1991 (rev. 2012) 52 0
21 Iraq 2005 51 11
22 Morocco 2011 51 7
23 Sudan 2005 48 9
24 Togo 1992 (rev. 2007)* 48 0
25 Bangladesh 1972 (reinst. 1986, rev. 2011)* 47 2
26 Guinea-Bissau 1984 (rev. 1991)* 46 0
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27 Niger 2010 46 0
28 Surinam 1987 (rev. 1992) 46 0
29 Iran 1979 (rev. 1989) 44 26
30 Chad 1996 (rev. 2005) 44 0
31 Pakistan 1973 (reinst. 2002, rev. 2012) 43 16
32 Bahrain 2002 43 11
33 Guinea 2010 43 0
34 Benin 1990* 42 0
35 Mali 1992 42 0
36 Syria 2012 41 5
37 Oman 1996 (rev. 2011) 39 8
38 Afghanistan 2004 36 13
39 Algeria 1963 (rev. 2008) 36 9
40 Libya 2011 35 8
41 Cote D'Ivoire 2000* 35 0
42 Gabon 1991 (rev. 1997)* 33 0
43 Yemen 1991 (rev. 2001) 32 13
44 Qatar 2003 32 8
45 Cameroon 1972 (rev. 2008)* 32 0
46 Indonesia 1945 (reinst. 1959, rev. 2002) 31 0
47 Senegal 2001 (rev. 2009) 31 0
48 Mauritania 1991 (rev. 2012) 30 9
49 United Arab Emirates 1971 (rev. 2004) 30 7
50 Malaysia 1957 (rev. 1996) 30 5
51 Jordan 1952 (rev. 2011) 28 4
52 Djibouti 1992 (rev. 2010) 25 1
53 Comoros 2001 (rev. 2009) 23 6
54 Saudi Arabia 1992 (rev. 2005) 13 23
55 Lebanon 1926 (rev. 2004) 13 0
56 Brunei 1959 (rev. 1984) 2 5
Note in the above table that the out of the bottom 10 Muslim
majority countries, in terms of the number of rights, only 2 (Lebanon
20151
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and Senegal) have non-Islamic constitutions. In contrast, in the top
10 countries in terms of the number of rights, only one (Maldives) has
an Islamic constitution. This is a very significant finding: while the
level of Islamicity in a constitution does not necessarily correlate with
a reduction in the number of rights in a constitution, Islamicity may
make a difference. Muslim countries that have zero levels of
Islamicity or have expressed a commitment to secularism guarantee,
in absolute terms, have a larger number of constitutional rights than
Muslim countries that have Islamized constitutions. Of course, there
are outliers: Lebanon registers zero Islamicity in its constitution, yet
has the second lowest count of rights (after Brunei). Similarly,
Maldives has a very Islamic constitution but also promises many
rights. Yet, these are exceptions. On average, secular Muslim
majority states promise more rights in their constitution than states
with Islamic constitutions. Notice in tables 3 and 4 that the
overwhelming majority of states promising the highest number of
rights in the Muslim world are all secular.
This, of course, does not necessarily mean the Islamicity caused less
number of rights or that it is in tension with rights. Indeed, work by one
of the authors demonstrates that sometimes the adoption of Islamic
supremacy clauses assists and legitimates the passage of rights in a
constitution.141 Certainly, there are many more factors that would
dictate the adoption of rights; for example, rights have become more
ubiquitous in constitutions adopted recently-that is, time is a factor.
However, this preliminary analysis implies that since Islamic
constitutions may sometimes be associated with a smaller catalogue
of rights - constitutional advisors hould focus more attention on the
basic political structures of the constitution, including the design of
constitutional courts and other bodies that will engage in
interpretation. The project of balancing rights and Islam cannot but
be resolved in each country through its own political and judicial
processes, and it is these, which should be the main focus in
constitutional design. These will include analysis of design options
concerning the mechanisms of judicial appointment, the role of jurists
and religious scholars in legal decision-making, standing rules to
challenge laws, qualifications of judges and so forth. We intend to
tackle this question in future work.
141. See generally Ahmed & Ginsburg, supra note 29.
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3. Islamicity and Gender Equality, Democracy and Political
Stability
Questions are often also raised about Constitutional Islamization
impacting women's rights, democracy and political stability. Using
a simple bivariate correlation, we investigated whether this was true
by comparing the Islamic Constitutions Index to the World Bank's
Gender parity index for gross enrolment ratio.142 We found a
considerable negative co-relation between Islamicity and gender
equality (Figure 4).
Figure 4. Gender Equality v Islamicity
142. Primary & Secondary combined is the ratio of female gross enrolment
ratio for primary and secondary to male gross enrolment ratio for primary and
secondary. It is calculated by dividing the female value for the indicator by the male
value. A GPI equal to 1 indicates parity between females and males. In general, a
value less than 1 indicates disparity in favor of males and a value greater than 1
indicates disparity in favor of females.
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R= -0.27. Source: World Bank WDI, 2013.
We then investigated whether countries that have more Islamic
constitution are less democratic. For this we used Islamicity of
constitutions and charted it against "Voice and Accountability." This
latter measure includes a number of indicators measuring various
aspects of the political process, civil liberties and political rights.
We found a considerable negative co-relation between Islamicity
of constitutions and voice and accountability (Figure 5).
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Figure 5. Islamicity and Voice and Accountability1 43
R= -0.33. Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), 2013.
For democracy, we also compared Islamicity of constitutions
against a measure of democracy from Freedom House. Again, we see
a weak, but negative co-relation (Figure 6).
143. "Voice and Accountability" includes a number of indicators measuring
various aspects of the political process, civil liberties and political rights. These
indicators measure the extent to which citizens of a country are able to participate in
the selection of governments. This category also includes indicators measuring the
independence of the media, which serves an important role in monitoring those in
authority and holding them accountable for their actions. The indicator scores lie
between -2.5 and 2.5, with higher scores corresponding to favorable outcomes
(World Bank, 2013).
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Finally, we asked, do higher degrees of Constitutional
Islamization correlate with politically unstable countries? "Political
Stability" combines several indicators, which measure perceptions of
the likelihood that the government in power will be destabilized or
overthrown by possibly unconstitutional and/or violent means,
including domestic violence and terrorism. The answer was yes:
there is a strong co-relation between degree of Islamicity of
constitutions and political instability.
20151 The Islamic Constitutions Index
Figure Z Islamicity and Political Stability'41
R= -0.40. Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), 2013.
144. "Political Stability" combines several indicators that measure
perceptions of the likelihood that the government in power will be destabilized or
overthrown by possibly unconstitutional and/or violent means, including domestic
violence and terrorism. The indicator scores lie between -2.5 and 2.5, with higher
scores corresponding to favorable outcomes (World Bank, 2013). Accordingly,
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia, and Sudan are considered outliers.
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V_ Conclusion
Western scholars and policymakers have long debated the
question of incorporating Islam in constitutions. Similarly, Muslim
majorities, Islamists and militants in certain countries have long
demanded the Islamization of constitutions. While popular
perceptions about Constitutional Islamization have persisted on both
sides, despite its rich potential, to date, there has been little empirical
measurement and investigation of the universe of Constitutional
Islamization. This Article attempted to fill this gap. It explained the
historical origins of Constitutional Islamization and elaborated on the
theory of Islamic Constitutionalism. In doing so, its primary and
novel contribution has been to undertake an empirical analysis of
Constitutional Islamization, or the constitutional incorporation of
Islamic clauses globally. Accordingly, it introduced the world's first
ranking of constitutions based on Islamicity- the "Islamic
Constitutions Index." Using the index, we queried whether more
Islamic constitutions have fewer rights, are associated with less
democracy, gender equality and political stability and the answer,
based on our preliminary and textual analysis seems to very
tentatively be yes. Although certainly not suggesting causation, this
co-relation needs to be further investigated. Does the inclusion of
Islamic clauses in constitutions bear any relationship to these effects
or is the co-relation simply coincidental? While this article should not
be seen making any causal claims, our work lays the foundations for
preparing some basis for investigating the relationship between Islam
and democracy in more detail empirically while recognizing that
qualitative analysis is equally necessary to deconstruct any
relationship identified by empirics. Yet, our findings do lend some
support to the view that the Muslim world will chart its own
indigenous version of democracy that may not be similar to Western
models. Hence, since the constitution will ultimately be interpreted
in each national context differently -constitutional advisors should
focus much more attention on the basic political structures of the
constitution, including the design of constitutional courts and other
bodies that will engage in interpretation of these complex "Islamic
constitutions."
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Q1. [STATEREL]- Does the constitution state that Islam is the state religion?
Yes (1 point)
No (0 point)
Q2. [PREAMBLE]- Does the Preamble reference Islamic idiom?
Yes (1 point)
No (0 point)
Q3. [UNITY]- Is there reference to the unity of OR association with the
Muslim world or any mention of Ummah (Islamic political community)?
Yes (1 point)
No (0 point)
Q4. [JIHAD]- Is there a reference to jihad or defense of the faith?
Yes (1 point)
No (0 point)








Q7. [CTZMUSLIM]- Should all citizens be Muslims?
Yes (1 point)
No (0 point)




Q9. [OATH]- Does it mention Islamic idiom in the presidential and/or
ministerial or parliamentary Oath?
Yes (1 point)
No (0 point)
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Ql. [AMENDMENT]- Are the provisions related to Islam unamendable?
Yes (1 point)
No (0 point)








Q14. [ACCOUNTABILITY]- Is government accountable to or to rule in




Q15. [RIGHTS1]- Does the constitution make the enjoyment of any rights or
freedoms subject to sharia requirements?
Yes (1 point)
No (0 point)
Q16. [WOMEN]- Is there a clause stating that women should serve their

















Q20. [SOURCE]- Is Islam identified as a source of legislation?
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Yes (1 point)
Otherwise (0 point)
Q21. [SUPERMACY] - What is its degree of supremacy of Islam? Code the





"Principles" of Islam/Islamic law/Sharia= 1 points
Regarding Law:
- "A" source of law or if there is no other law governing a matter then Islamic law
can come in=l points
- "A" primary or basic or foundational source of law=2 points
"THE" source (or the only source). (In case it is implying that Islamic law is the
only source)=3 points
Examples:
- "Islamic law is the source of all legislation" Score:2+3=5
"The principles of Islam is the source of all legislation" Score: 1+3=4
"The principles of Islam are the major/primary source of all legislation" Score:
1+2=3
- "Islamic Sharia is a major source of legislation" Score: 2+2=4





Q23. [JUDICIARY]- Is there an explicit provision requiring the judiciary to
apply Sharia or refuse to apply laws that contradict it?
Yes (1 point)
No (0 point)




Q25. [COMPLIANCE]- Does the constitution mention a religious council or
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F. Economy
Q26. [ECONOMY] - Does it provide that the economy/trade or banking will
be in accordance with Islam?
Yes (1 point)
No (0 point)
Q27. [INTEREST]- Does the constitution ban interest rate (riba)? (Asked only
if ECONOMY is answered 1)
Yes (1 point)
No (0 point)





Q29. [CRIME]- Does the constitution make any explicit provision that
Islamic criminal penalties (amputations, stoning) will be implemented?
Yes (1 point)
No (0 point)
Q30. [EDUCATION]- Does the constitution make provision for the state to
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